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I. INTRODUCTION
D URING the twenty-one month period from October 1,
1984 to July 1, 1986, President Ronald W. Reagan
appointed six new judges to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Sixth Circuit. As a result, eight of the fifteen active
judges on this court have been appointed by a president who
had both the commitment and the opportunity to transform the
federal judiciary with his appointments.' This article reviews
1. See generally Goldman, Reagan's Second Term Judicial Appointments:
The Battle at Midway, 70 JUDICATURE 324 (1987); Goldman, Reaganizing the
Judiciary: The First Term Appointments, 68 JUDIcATURE 313 (1985). President
Reagan appointed almost one-half of the active (i.e., non-senior) federal court
judges. This includes 72 of the 150 active judges on the regional courts of
[Vol.20
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recent developments in section 19832 litigation in the Sixth
Circuit against the background of these appointments. 3
This article looks at the most significant developments in
section 1983 litigation in the Sixth Circuit during the two-year
period from January 1, 1987 to December 31, 1988. The emphasis
is on the remedial and procedural issues that arise in section
1983 litigation rather than on the underlying federal constitutional
and statutory rights enforceable through section 1983. 4 This
focus on the section 1983 remedy permits an examination of
plaintiffs' access to federal courts5 and is one way to gauge the
appeals and 272 of the 556 active district court judges. These figures do not
include the 25 vacancies in these courts. See CONG. Q. WEEKLY REP. 3392
(Nov. 26, 1988).
The number of Sixth Circuit appointments available to President Reagan
was attributable, in part, to the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333 (1984), which increased the
number of Sixth Circuit judgeships from eleven to fifteen.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982), generally referred to merely as § 1983, is the
modem version of § 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat.
13, and the principal remedial provision for the private enforcement of federal
constitutional provisions in civil litigation against state and local governments
and their employees. See generally Developments in the Law - Section 1983
and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. REv. 1133 (1977).
3. The eight current Reagan appointees to the Sixth Circuit and their year
of appointment are: Robert B. Krupansky (1982); Harry W. Wellford (1982);
H. Ted Milburn (1984); Ralph B. Guy, Jr. (1985); David A. Nelson (1985);
James L. Ryan (1985); Danny J. Boggs (1986); and Alan E. Norris (1986). In
addition, Leroy J. Contie, Jr., who was appointed by President Reagan in
1982, took senior status in 1986.
The other active Sixth Circuit judges during the period under study and their
appointing president and year of appointment are: Pierce Lively (Nixon; 1972);
Albert J. Engel (Nixon; 1973); Damon J. Keith (Carter; 1977); Gilbert S.
Merritt (Carter; 1977); Cornelia G. Kennedy (Carter; 1979); Boyce F. Martin,
Jr. (Carter; 1979); and Nathaniel R. Jones (Carter; 1979). Judge Lively took
senior status on January 1, 1989.
4. Section 1983 does not confer any substantive rights, see Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617 (1979), but is a remedy for
violations of federal statutory and constitutional rights. See Maine v. Thiboutot,
448 U.S. 1 (1980) (federal statutes); Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S.
538 (1972) (federal constitutional claims).
5. Although a remedial statute applicable in both state and federal courts,
§ 1983 is most commonly identified with federal court litigation. There is,
however, an increase in state court § 1983 litigation, driven, in part, by the
growing hostility of federal courts and federal doctrines to § 1983 claims. See
generally Steinglass, The Emerging State Court § 1983 Action: A Procedural
Review, 38 U. MaM L. REv. 381, 394-424 & 432-39 (1984).
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seriousness with which the federal courts assume responsibility
for protecting fundamental federal rights.
Section 1983 litigation has become exceedingly complex-far
more complex than traditional tort litigation-as Judge Frank
Easterbrook, one of the better known recent conservative
academic appointments to the federal appellate courts, has noted.6
Thus, section 1983 litigation presents sophisticated as well as
unsophisticated litigants with many opportunities to stumble. It
is this author's belief, however, that the path to the federal
courthouse should be cleared of unnecessary obstacles so that
cases may be decided on their merits, and this article examines
section 1983 litigation in the Sixth Circuit against this standard.
Section 1983 litigation also constitutes a substantial portion
of the civil litigation in the federal courts. For example, during
the one-year period from July 1, 1987 to June 30, 1988, the
Sixth Circuit terminated 2,337 appeals on the merits. 7 There are
no reliable statistics as to how many of these cases were section
1983 as contrasted to other "civil rights" cases, 8 but during
each of the two years covered by this study, the Sixth Circuit,
on the average, cited section 1983 in 72 published and 378
unpublished opinions. 9 Not all these cases were section 1983
cases, as a number simply cited section 1983 in the course of
addressing other claims. On the other hand, section 1983 opinions
6. See Kirchoff v. Flynn, 786 F.2d 320, 323-24 (7th Cir. 1986) (describing
the greater complexity of § 1983 litigation and observing that "the risks
plaintiffs face in § 1983 litigation are greater and the rewards smaller").
7. See Arm~TRAs vE OrInC oF U. S. CTS., ANNi. REP. Tables S-3 & B-
5 (1988). These 2,337 cases fall into the following categories: Criminal (309);
U.S. Prisoner Petitions (131); Other U.S. Civil (335); Private Prisoner Petitions
(594); Other Private Civil (744); Bankruptcy (50); Administrative Appeals (152);
Original Proceedings (22). Id. at Table B-5.
8. The Administrative Office of the United States Courts collects its
statistics from the civil cover sheets completed by attorneys at the time of
filing, but the "civil rights" category is broader than § 1983. Thus, the published
figures overstate the volume of § 1983 litigation. See Eisenberg, Section 1983:
Doctrinal Foundations and an Empirical Study, 67 CoRNEu L. Rlv. 482, 522-
38 (1982).
9. In 1987 there were 66 published and 341 unpublished Sixth Circuit
opinions that cited § 1983. In 1988, there were 78 and 414 respectively. This
information was obtained by searching the Sixth Circuit's "unpublished dis-
position" opinions, which are available on WESTLAW.
[Vol.20
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do not always cite section 1983, and plaintiffs are not obligated
to plead section 1983 in order to state section 1983 claims. 10
Thus, these figures are only proxies for the actual volume of
section 1983 actions, but it is clear that section 1983 litigation
constitutes a substantial part of the appellate caseload of the
Sixth Circuit. I  This review of section 1983 litigation in the
Sixth Circuit serves several different purposes.
First, this review of recent developments in section 1983
litigation should assist practitioners and judges who must struggle
to keep current with this expanding body of law. The specific
procedural and remedial issues discussed in depth include statutes
of limitations, preclusion, immunities, the use of deadly force,
municipal liability, damages, and waivers of section 1983 claims.
2
10. See Americans United for Separation of Church & State v. School Dist.
of the City of Grand Rapids, 835 F.2d 627 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding an action
to be under § 1983 and authorizing an award of fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988
despite the failure of the plaintiff to plead § 1983).
11. For a discussion of the disproportionate increase in the federal court
caseload in the federal courts of appeals, see R. POSNER, Tn FEDERAL COURTS
65 (1985) (789% increase in appeals from district courts between 1960 and
1983).
12. During the period under study, the Sixth Circuit also decided a number
of important cases defining the federal constitutional rights enforceable through
§ 1983. See, e.g., Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d 943 (6th Cir. 1988) (inmate may
bring a substantive due process claim against prison officials who allegedly
planted illegal drugs on him in retaliation for complaints about prison condi-
tions); Gutzwiller v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988) (finding denial of
tenure to violate equal protection and substantive due process); Akron Center
for Reproductive Health v. Slaby, 854 F.2d 852 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding Ohio
parental notification abortion statute unconstitutional), appealfiled, 57 U.S.L.W.
3378 (U.S. Nov. 10, 1988); Duchesne v. Williams, 849 F.2d 1004 (6th Cir.
1988) (en banc) (discharged municipal employees not entitled to pretermination
hearings before neutral and impartial decision-makers other than the supervisors
who fired them), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1535 (1989); Doe by Doe v. Austin,
848 F.2d 1386 (6th Cir.) (mentally retarded adults do not have a due process
right to prior judicial hearings before being committed or to periodic judicial
review), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 495 (1988); Lovvorn v. City of Chattanooga,
Tennessee, 846 F.2d 1539 (6th Cir. 1988) (mandatory urinalysis testing of
firefighters without reasonable cause or suspicion that firefighters tested used
controlled substances violates the fourth amendment), judgment vacated and
reh'g en bane granted, 861 F.2d 1388 (6th Cir. 1988); Penny v. Kennedy, 846
F.2d 1563 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying same ruling to police officers), judgment
vacated and reh'g en banc granted, 862 F.2d 567 (6th Cir. 1988); Rezadkowlski
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In addition, there are briefer discussions of the use of section
1983 to raise statutory claims, abstention, the color of law
requirement, and the relevance of adequate state remedies. 3
Second, the article critically reviews a number of Sixth Circuit
decisions on section 1983 procedural and remedial issues and
concludes that the court's performance has often fallen short of
the standards that the bench, the bar, and the public have a
right to expect from the federal appellate courts. 14
Third, this article provides some information about the reality
of section 1983 litigation. Section 1983 litigation is often the
subject of broad generalizations, but scholars have done little
empirical or other research on what is actually happening in
v. Village of Lake Orion, 845 F.2d 653 (6th Cir. 1988) (upholding limitation
on the number of billboards); Chernin v. Welchans, 844 F.2d 322 (6th Cir.
1988) (with a minor exception upholding the constitutionality of Ohio rent
withholding statutes); Loudermill v. Cleveland Bd. of Educ., 844 F.2d 304 (6th
Cir.) (on remand) (constitutionally required pretermination hearing for public
employee could be held without advance notice and before a supervisor without
authority to discharge the employee), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 363 (1988);
Newsome v. Batavia Local School Dist., 842 F.2d 920 (6th Cir. 1988) (due
process does not entitle high school student to cross-examine student accusers
and school officials at expulsion hearing); Michigan Road Builder's Ass'n, Inc.
v. Milliken, 834 F.2d 583 (6th Cir. 1987) (finding unconstitutional Michigan
set-aside law providing state contracts for minority and women business enter-
prises), aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 1333 (1989); Thompson v. Commonwealth of Ken-
tucky, Dep't of Corrections, 833 F.2d 614 (6th Cir. 1987) (prison policy
governing visitation creates a liberty interest entitling inmates to procedural
due process), cert. granted, 108 S. Ct. 2869 (1988); Mozert v. Hawkins County
Bd. of Educ., 827 F.2d 1058 (6th Cir. 1987) (rejecting free exercise of religion
claim by students required to use text books they found offensive), cert. denied,
108 S. Ct. 1029 (1988).
13. The Sixth Circuit also decided a number of important issues in civil
rights actions not brought under § 1983 during this period. See, e.g., Gutzwiller
v. Fenik, 860 F.2d 1317 (6th Cir. 1988) (district court in Title VII action bound
by jury's findings on § 1983 claim); Mallory v. Eyrich, 839 F.2d 275 (6th Cir.
1988) (applying the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections); Jaimes v. Lucas
Metro. Hous. Auth., 833 F.2d 1203 (6th Cir. 1987) (upholding a race conscious
desegregation plan for public housing under Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1968); Conklin v. Lovely, 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1987) (interpreting 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3) as not limited to racially based conspiracies and extending
the cause of action to politically-motivated conspiracies).
14. The article is particularly critical of Sixth Circuit § 1983 decisions on
statutes of limitations and preclusion. See infra notes 18-121 and accompanying
text.
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section 1983 litigation in the lower federal courts or in the state
courts.' Nonetheless, proposals for changes in section 1983 are
often based on assumptions about the volume and nature of
section 1983 litigation. 16 Therefore, it is important for the full
picture to be painted, but for this to happen a number of
smaller studies must be done. This review of section 1983
litigation in the Sixth Circuit is one small piece of that larger
picture. It also suggests, however, the need for similar reviews
of section 1983 litigation in other forums.
Finally, the article documents the doctrinal shift that has
taken place in section 1983 litigation in the Sixth Circuit as a
result of the change in composition of the court and the emergence
of a new working majority. Once one of the most sympathetic
federal circuits to section 1983 claims, the Sixth Circuit has
sharply changed direction. A conservative majority is now
aggressively rearranging the doctrinal foundation for section
1983 litigation. In both en banc rehearings and panel decisions,
the Sixth Circuit is reaching out to decide section .1983 issues in
such a way as to increase the difficulty section 1983 plaintiffs
have in convincing federal courts to reach the merits of their
federal claims. 7
15. But see Eisenberg & Schwab, The Reality of Constitutional Tort Liti-
gation, 72 CoRNELL L. REv. 641 (1987); Eisenberg, supra note 8. But see also
Steinglass, supra note 5, at 435 & 559-64 (breakdown of state court § 1983
litigation by year, state, and type of case).
16. See Eisenberg & Schwab, supra note 15, at 645.
17. There has been an increase in the volume of en banc rehearings in the
Sixth Circuit in recent years. See Trier, Increased En Banc Activity by the
Sixth Circuit, 19 U. ToL. L. REv. 277 (1988). For example, during the four
year period from 1980 to 1983 the Sixth Circuit rendered only eleven en banc
decisions, but in the four year period from 1984 to 1987, the court rendered
twenty-eight en banc decisions. See Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review,
67 N.C.L. Rv. 29, 45 (1988). There has also been an increase in en banc
rehearings in other circuits, see Note, The Politics of En Banc Review, 102
HARv. L. Rv. 864, 866-74 (1989) (concluding that ideological considerations
have influenced the recent increase in en banc reviews), a practice that has
even come under criticism from some Reagan appointees. See Bartlett ex rel
Neuman v. Bowman, 824 F.2d 1240, 1246 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (Silberman, J.,
concurring) (opinion concurring in denials of rehearings en banc); Rakovich v.
Wade, 850 F.2d 1179, 1180 (7th Cir. 1987) (Ripple, J., dissent) (dissent on
grant of rehearing en banc) (characterizing a particular rehearing en banc as
giving a favored classes of defendants 'a third bite at the apple.').
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II. STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS
It is difficult to overstate the confusion that has reigned in
the Sixth Circuit on section 1983 statute of limitations issues
since 1985, when the Supreme Court in Wilson v. Garcia8
required the selection of the state statute of limitations for
personal injury actions. By addressing this issue in Mulligan v.
Hazard,9 an Ohio case in which the choice of the appropriate
limitations period need not have been made, by treating the
Mulligan dictum as a holding, and by refusing, until recently,
to address the issue in an en banc rehearing, despite its adoption
of a conflicting approach in Michigan, the Sixth Circuit has
denied trial courts and litigants the bright line that statutes of
limitations should provide. Moreover, these decisions and related
decisions applying the newly adopted limitations period
retroactively and limiting the use of state tolling policies have
denied many section 1983 plaintiffs access to federal courts. The
final chapter on most of these issues will be written by the
Supreme Court, but in the four years since Wilson the Sixth
Circuit has done little to clarify the law on statutes of limitations
and much to confuse it.
A. Selecting the Appropriate Limitations Period
1. Wilson v. Garcia
Prior to Wilson, federal appellate courts followed a variety
of approaches to selecting the appropriate limitations period for
section 1983 and related civil rights actions. 20 Some federal
circuits selected a single limitations period in each state by
18. 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
19. 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
20. See Shapiro, Choosing the Appropriate State Statute of Limitations for
Section 1983 Claims After Wilson v. Garcia: A Theory Applied to Maryland
Law, 16 U. BALT. L. REv. 242, 243-44 (1987); Brophy, Statutes of Limitations
in Federal Civil Rights Litigation, 1976 Asuz. ST. L.J. 97. The different
approaches were discussed by the Tenth Circuit in Garcia v. Wilson, 731 F.2d
640 (10th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd, 471 U.S. 261 (1985).
[Vol.20
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borrowing the limitations period for liability based on statutes. 2'
Other circuits, including the Sixth Circuit," required the use of
the state limitations period that was most analogous to the
particular section 1983 claim at issue. 23 Under this approach,
however, a single event could give rise to multiple section 1983
claims each of which could be subject to a different limitations
period depending upon the analogous state law claim.2'
The Supreme Court in Wilson sought to end this confusion
by treating the characterization of civil actions for purposes of
selecting a section 1983 statute of limitations as a matter of
federal law and by requiring the use of a single limitations
period in each state.25 The Wilson Court also identified the
criteria for selecting the appropriate limitations period for section
1983 actions and concluded that the 42d Congress "would have
characterized § 1983 as conferring a general remedy for injuries
to personal rights."26
In Wilson, the Court explicitly rejected the statute of limitations
for liability based on statutes as well as the limitations period
from the New Mexico Tort Claims Act for actions against
governmental entities. In taking this position, the Court noted
the wide diversity of federal constitutional claims that section
1983 ultimately came to embrace27 and observed that the section
1983 claim under consideration-a claim of excessive force in
the course of an arrest-was "arguably analogous to distinct
state tort claims for false arrest, assault and battery, or personal
21. See, e.g., Garmon v. Foust, 668 F.2d 400 (8th Cir.) (en banc), cert.
denied, 456 U.S. 998 (1982); Beard v. Robinson, 563 F.2d 331 (7th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 438 U.S. 907 (1978); Donovan v. Reinbold, 433 F.2d 738 (9th
Cir. 1970).
22. See Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, Ohio, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cir. 1982).
See also infra note 76.
23. See, e.g., McMillan v. City of Rockmart, 653 F.2d 907, 909 (5th Cir.
Unit B 1981); Polite v. Diehl, 507 F.2d 119 (3d Cir. 1974).
24. See Wilson, 471 U.S. at 274 n.33 (discussing Polite).
25. Id. at 268-75.
26. Id. at 278.
27. See id. at 273-74 & n.31 (relying on Blackmun, Section 1983 and Federal
Protection of Individual Rights-Will the Statute Remain Alive or Fade Away?,
60 N.Y.U.L. RIv. 1, 19-20 (1985)).
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injuries.' '28 Nonetheless, the Court required the adoption of the
general limitations period for personal injuries rather than the
limitations period for intentional torts. In choosing the former,
the Court opted for the general over the specific, despite the
close resemblance between much of the lawless conduct that the
Civil Rights Act of 1871 was designed to curb and many
traditional common law torts.
In requiring the use of a general limitations period that was
broadly applicable to state court litigation, the Court wanted to
assure that states would not discriminate against section 1983
actions.
General personal injury actions, sounding in tort, constitute a
major part of the total volume of civil litigation in the state courts
today, and probably did so in 1871 when § 1983 was enacted. It
is most unlikely that the period of limitations applicable to such
claims ever was, or ever would be, fixed in a way that would
discriminate against federal claims, or be inconsistent with federal
law in any respect. 29
The Court's decision in Wilson removed some, but not all,
of the uncertainty concerning the selection of the appropriate
statute of limitations in litigation under section 1983 and other
surviving Reconstruction-era civil right actions. Most states have
more than one limitations period for personal injury actions,30
and, as Justice O'Connor correctly pointed out in her dissent,
Wilson did not "resolve [the] confusion [but] banish[ed] it to
the lower courts." ' 3' Most importantly, Wilson left unresolved
the important issue of the appropriate limitations period in those
states that have one limitations period for general personal injury
28. 471 U.S. at 273.
29. Id. at 279. See also Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2310-11 (1988)
(notice of claim requirement that only applies to governmental defendants
discriminates against federal rights).
30. One commentator identified twenty-seven jurisdictions with different
limitations periods for actions involving intentional torts and most other
personal injury actions. See Shapiro, supra note 20, at 245 n.18.
31. 471 U.S. at 286. Justice O'Connor would have retained the policy of
applying the statute of limitations for the most analogous state law claim. Id.
at 280.
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actions and another, invariably shorter,32 limitations period for
various enumerated intentional torts.33
This issue, however, was ultimately resolved by the Supreme
Court in Owens v. Okure 4 in which a unanimous Court
reaffirmed Wilson and rejected the use of state statutes of
limitations for enumerated intentional torts in favor of the state
''general or residual statute of limitations governing personal
injury actions. '35
2. The Sixth Circuit-Interpreting Wilson v. Garcia
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Owens, the Sixth
Circuit had addressed the section 1983 statute of limitations
issue in Mulligan v. Hazard.3 6 The Mulligan court construed
Wilson to require the use of the one-year Ohio statute of
limitations for enumerated intentional torts and applied this
period retroactively.
The issue of the applicability of the one-year limitations period
in Mulligan should not have been reached. Mulligan involved a
due process claim by a professor at a regional branch of Ohio
State University who sought university-wide, as contrasted to
32. In the jurisdictions identified by one commentator as having more than
one limitations period, every state except Alabama maintains a longer limitations
period for personal injury actions than for intentional torts. See Shapiro, supra
note 20, at 245 n.18.
33. The argument in favor of a § 1983 statute of limitations based on
intentional torts rests on the fact that the underlying federal rights actionable
through § 1983 generally require intentional conduct or its equivalent. See,
e.g., Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327 (1986) (due process); Estelle v. Gamble,
429 U.S. 97 (1976) (eighth amendment); Village of Arlington Heights v.
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252 (1977) (equal protection); Wash-
ington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (equal protection). The Court, however,
has not applied a state of mind requirement to § 1983. See Daniels v. Williams,
474 U.S. 327, 329-30 (1986); Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 534-35 (1981).
34. 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989), aff'g 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987).
35. Id. at 582. See also infra notes 52-55 and accompanying text.
36. 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
Mulligan was fully briefed before the Supreme Court's April 17, 1985 decision
in Wilson but argued on June 4, 1985. No supplemental briefing was submitted
on the statute of limitations issue, although questions were asked at oral
argument concerning Wilson. Telephone interview with Frederick G. Cloppert,
Jr., Counsel for the Plaintiff in Mulligan (Jan. 23, 1986).
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campus-specific, tenure. She had been hired in 1973 and was
awarded campus-specific tenure in 1979. She filed her action in
October, 1983, but the Sixth Circuit found that her action
accrued eight years earlier in 1975 when the Board of Trustees
changed the applicable tenure rules. Thus, her section 1983 claim
was time-barred regardless of the limitations period that the
Sixth Circuit selected for section 1983 claims.17
The plaintiff claimed, however, that her action accrued in
1980, when she first became aware of the change in tenure
policies,3" and that her October, 1983 suit was timely under
Ohio's four-year residual limitations period. Thus, it was proper
for the Sixth Circuit to address whether the four-year period
applied. If it did not, however, there was no reason to decide
which of Ohio's shorter limitations periods was applicable to
section 1983 actions.
Nonetheless, the Mulligan court addressed a number of
important statute of limitations issues. Initially, the court
determined which of Ohio's four different limitations periods
should be used in section 1983 cases. In two separate statutes,
Ohio applies a one-year limitations period to such intentional
torts as libel, slander, assault, battery, malicious prosecution,
and false imprisonment.3 9 In addition, Ohio has a two-year
limitations period for actions for "bodily injury or injuring
personal property. '" 40 Finally, Ohio has a four-year residual
limitations period "[flor an injury to the rights of the plaintiff
not arising on contract nor enumerated in [other] sections.'"'
In selecting the one-year limitations period for enumerated
intentional torts, the Sixth Circuit relied on language from
Wilson in which the Supreme Court described the lawlessness
that led to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, the predecessor of
section 1983. The court, however, ignored the Wilson Court's
refusal to characterize the pending action as an intentional tort
37. 777 F.2d at 341-42.
38. Under federal law, § 1983 actions accrue when a party knew or should
have known of the injury that is the basis of the action. See Chardon v.
Fernandez, 454 U.S. 6 (1981).
39. See Omo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 2305.11 (Anderson 1981) (enumerated
intentional torts); § 2305.111 (Anderson Supp. 1986) (assault or battery).
40. Omo Rv. CODE AN. § 2305.10 (Anderson 1981).
41. Omo Rnv. CODE AN l. § 2305.09(D) (Anderson 1981).
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and the language in Wilson requiring the use of the general
limitations period.
The implications of Mulligan on the federal court section 1983
caseload was quickly seen, and federal courts throughout the
Sixth Circuit applied the Mulligan dictum to dismiss section
1983 cases that were not filed within the one-year period. 42
Moreover, Sixth Circuit panels consistently followed Mulligan
in Ohio cases, 43 despite the reservations of at least one Sixth
Circuit judge about the selection of a limitations period based
on intentional torts.44
The Sixth Circuit's continued adherence to and even
understanding of Mulligan were called into question by its
treatment of the statute of limitations issue in Michigan. In
Carroll v. Wilkerson45 the Sixth Circuit purported to rely on
Mulligan in adopting the three-year Michigan limitations period
for "injury to a person" 46 rather than the two-year period for
"an action charging assault, battery, or false imprisonment." 47
Mulligan and Carroll are irreconcilable, a point suggested by
Justice White in his dissent from the denial of certiorari in
Carroll when he observed that "the confusion evidenced by this
split [among the circuits] is underscored by the Sixth Circuit's
42. Lower courts within a jurisdiction are not obligated to follow dictum,
see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 27 comment i (1980), but trial
courts in the Sixth Circuit appear to have enthusiastically followed Mulligan.
See, e.g., Haskell v. Washington Township, 864 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1988)
(reversing trial court's sua sponte raising of one-year Ohio statute of limitations
that defendants failed to raise in their first responsive pleading).
43. See, e.g., Demery v. City of Youngstown, 818 F.2d 1257 n.3 (6th Cir.
1987); Thomas v. Shipka, 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir. 1987), on reh'g, 829 F.2d
570 (6th Cir.), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989); Jones v. Shankland, 800 F.2d
77 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 2177 (1987). See also infra note
55.
44. See, e.g., 818 F.2d at 1261 (Guy, J., concurring) ("[If writing in
Mulligan I would have opted for Ohio's two-year statute rather than the one-
year statute chosen.").
45. 782 F.2d 44 (6th Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. County of Wayne v.
Carroll, 479 U.S. 923 (1986).
46. MICH. Com'. LAws § 600.5805(8) (1979).
47. MICH. Comp. LAws § 600.5805(2) (1979).
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change in approach. "48 Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit, until
recently, refused to hear this issue en banc to resolve this split
within the Circuit.49
On June 20, 1988, however, the Sixth Circuit agreed to hear
the issue en banc in Browning v. Pendelton.5 0 This belated
decision only came after the Supreme Court granted certiorari
on this issue in Owens v. Okure,' a case from the Second
Circuit.
The Supreme Court's subsequent decision in Owens not only
requires the rejection of the one-year Ohio limitations period
48. 479 U.S. at 924 (White, J., dissenting), (opinion on denial of cert.).
See also Mulligan v. Hazard, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)
(identifying split among the circuits), denying cert. to 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir.
1985).
49. See, e.g., Jones v. Shankland, supra (denying rehearing en banc), 800
F.2d 77 (6th Cir. 1986).
50. 869 F.2d 989 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Browning was argued before
the full Sixth Circuit on December 7, 1988. On March 16, 1989, the court
acknowledged both the inconsistency between Mulligan and Carroll and the
Supreme Court's subsequent rejection of the Mulligan approach in Owens v.
Okure, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989). The Sixth Circuit then treated the issue as
involving a choice between Ohio's one-year and two-year limitations periods
and selected the latter. The court made no reference to Ohio's four-year
residual limitations period, which the Supreme Court in Owens had suggested
was inappropriate for § 1983 claims. See infra notes 51-54 and accompanying
text.
Given the absence of any reference to the four-year limitations period in
Browning, the case apparently leaves this issue open for another day. None-
theless, the failure of the Sixth Circuit to acknowledge that it had not reached
the issue of the four-year limitations period will likely result in Browning
becoming a virtually insurmountable obstacle for Ohio plaintiffs seeking a
four-year limitations period for § 1983 claims.
Browning will also raise the issue of whether the new limitations period
should be applied retroactively to lengthen the time to sue, but federal courts
addressing this issue under Wilson had consistently given plaintiffs the benefit
of longer limitations periods. See, e.g., Small v. Inhabitants of City of Belfast,
796 F.2d 544 (1st Cir. 1986); Rivera v. Green, 775 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1985),
cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1128 (1988); Jones v. Preuitt & Mauldin, 763 F.2d 1250
(1lth Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1105 (1986), on remand, 851 F.2d 1321
(llth Cir. 1988) (en banc), vacated on other grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1105 (1989).
See also Farmer v. Cook, 782 F.2d 780, 781 (8th Cir. 1986) (distinguishing the
reliance of plaintiffs and defendants on shorter limitations periods).
51. 108 S. Ct. 1218 (1988), granting cert. to 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987)
(selecting the three-year New York statute "to recover damages for a personal
injury" over the one-year period for enumerated intentional torts).
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for enumerated intentional torts, but also should resolve the
issue of whether the two-year limitations period for "bodily
injury" or the four-year residual limitations period "[flor an
injury to the rights of the plaintiff" is appropriate in section
1983 cases in Ohio.5 2 In rejecting the use of the limitations
period for enumerated intentional torts, the Owens Court
expressed concern about the confusion that would result because
of the existence of multiple intentional tort limitations provisions
in every state. To illustrate this point, the Court specifically
identified Ohio's various intentional tort limitations periods,
including the two-year period for "bodily injury" actions. 3
Thus, Owens appears to require the use of the four-year residual
limitations period for section 1983 actions in Ohio.1 Nonetheless,
Owens offers little assistance to the many section 1983 plaintiffs
in Ohio whose cases were dismissed based on the one-year
limitations period adopted by Mulligan."
The impact of Owens in the other states within the Sixth
Circuit will vary. The selection of the three-year Michigan statute
of limitations in Carroll, despite its purported reliance on
Mulligan, really ignored Mulligan and applied a general
limitations period that is consistent with Owens. Thus, Owens
will not cause any changes in section 1983 practice in Michigan.
Likewise, Owens should not change the selection of the section
1983 statute of limitations in Tennessee. In Berndt v. Tennessee 6
the Sixth Circuit adopted the one-year Tennessee limitations
52. See supra notes 40-41.
53. 109 S. Ct. 573, 578 (1989).
54. But see supra note 50. Prior to Owens, at least one federal court
construed Wilson as precluding the use of personal injury statutes narrowly
limited to claims involving bodily injury. See Saldivar v. Cadena, 622 F. Supp.
949, 955 (W.D. Wis. 1985) (applying the six-year Wisconsin limitations period
"for an injury to the character or rights of another" rather than the three-
year general limitations period "for injuries to the person" because the former
does not require bodily injury).
55. In reliance on Mulligan, the Sixth Circuit in unpublished opinions
available on WESTLAW dismissed at least twelve § 1983 actions in Ohio
federal courts as not timely under the one-year limitations period. In addition,
the Sixth Circuit presumably dismissed other cases in unpublished decisions not
available on WESTLAW and district courts dismissed other cases that were
not appealed.
56. 796 F.2d 879 (6th Cir. 1986).
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period that applied not only to "injury to the person" but also
to most enumerated intentional torts.5 7
In Kentucky, on the other hand, the impact of Owens is less
clear. Kentucky has a one-year limitations period for "an injury
to the person" and for such torts as malicious prosecution,
conspiracies, and arrest, 58 and the Sixth Circuit in McSurely v.
Hutchison59 relied on Wilson to apply this period to Bivens
actions, thus making clear that this one-year period also applied
to section 1983 actions. Kentucky, however, also has a residual
five-year limitations period for an "action for an injury to the
rights of the plaintiff, not arising on contract, and not otherwise
enumerated" 6 and it is uncertain whether courts will be required
to apply this period to section 1983 actions. 61
B. The Retroactivity of Wilson v. Garcia
The Sixth Circuit's adoption in Mulligan of a one-year
limitations period for section 1983 actions in Ohio was dictum,
but the decision to apply the new limitations period retroactively
was not. 62 If a four-year or longer limitations period had applied
to the plaintiff's tenure denial under the Sixth Circuit's prior
approach, her section 1983 action would not have been time-
barred under a prospective application of Wilson. Thus, it was
appropriate for the Sixth Circuit to determine whether any of
the shorter limitations periods identified in Mulligan could be
applied retroactively to cut off the plaintiff's right to sue.
57. TENN. CODE ANN. § 28-3-104(a) (1980). But see infra note 61.
58. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.140(1)(a), (c) (Baldwin 1988).
59. 823 F.2d 1002 (6th Cir. 1987), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 1107 (1988).
Courts generally apply Wilson to govern the selection of the statute of limi-
tations for actions against federal officials under Bivens v. Six Unknown
Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971). See, e.g., Chin v. Bowen, 833 F.2d 21
(2d Cir. 1987); Drum v. Nasuti, 648 F. Supp. 888 (E.D. Pa. 1986).
60. Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 413.120(6) (Baldwin 1988).
61. The Second Circuit in Okure v. Owens, 816 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1987),
aff'd, 109 S. Ct. 573 (1989), also found the one-year limitations period too
short, but the Supreme Court in Owens did not reach this issue. 109 S. Ct. at
582 n.13. The Tennessee one-year limitations period clearly raises this issue,
and the Sixth Circuit may also have to address it in Kentucky if the court
adheres to McSurley.
62. This assumes that the plaintiff's § 1983 action accrued in 1980. See
supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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To support its conclusion, the Mulligan court relied principally
on Wilson in which the Supreme Court applied the newly
adopted New Mexico limitations period retroactively. 3 The Sixth
Circuit, however, ignored the fact that the Wilson Court had
approved the retroactive application of a new limitations period
that lengthened the time to sue, while Mulligan had involved a
new limitations period that shortened the time to sue.6
In deciding this issue, the Mulligan court not only misconstrued
Wilson but also ignored Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson,65 the
Supreme Court's leading decision on the retroactivity of statutes
of limitations.
The Sixth Circuit found support for its retroactive application
of the statute of limitations in its cases applying a new statute
of limitations to actions under section 301 of the Labor
Management Relations Act." In DelCostello v. International
Brotherhood of Teamsters67 the Supreme Court had adopted a
six-month limitations period for section 301 actions. The Sixth
Circuit, in Smith v. General Motors Corp.," applied this period
retroactively, and the Mulligan court relied on Smith to apply
a per se Sixth Circuit policy in favor of the retroactive application
of new statutes of limitations.
In Chevron, however, the Supreme Court required a more
careful inquiry into whether newly adopted statutes of limitations
should be applied retroactively and adopted a three-part balancing
test, which required inter alia, a determination as to whether a
party was justified in relying on a prior limitations period. 69
63. See 777 F.2d 340, 343-44 (6th Cir. 1985).
64. The Mulligan court also ignored Wilson's citation with apparent ap-
proval of Jackson v. City of Bloomfield, 731 F.2d 652, 654-55 (10th Cir. 1984),
in which the Tenth Circuit refused to apply its new approach to § 1983 statutes
of limitations retroactively to shorten the limitations period. See Wilson, 471
U.S. at 265 n.10.
65. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
66. 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1982).
67. 462 U.S. 151 (1983).
68. 747 F.2d 372 (6th Cir. 1984) (en banc).
69. See, 404 U.S. at 106-07 (three-step test of retroactivity). See also infra
notes 261-302 and accompanying text (discussing the application of Chevron
to Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985)).
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Subsequent to Mulligan, the Supreme Court addressed the
retroactivity issue in private employment discrimination litigation
under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 .70 In St. Francis College v. Al-Khazrajp'
the Court upheld a refusal to apply a shortened limitations
period retroactively because the Third Circuit had clearly
established a longer period for section 1981 actions in
Pennsylvania, thus justifying the plaintiff's reliance on the longer
period. In Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co.,72 on the other hand,
the Court found that at the time that section 1981 action arose,
the limitations period in Pennsylvania was not clearly established
and the plaintiffs' reliance on the period was not justified. Thus,
the Court upheld the retroactive application of the shorter period
even though it cut off the plaintiffs' ability to sue.
In Thomas v. Shipka73 the Sixth Circuit granted a rehearing
for the limited purpose of addressing the retroactivity issue and
explicitly adopted the balancing approach of Chevron.74 Thomas
involved a claim by a municipal employee that she was terminated
from her non-policy making job for political reasons, but the
Sixth Circuit held that the four-year limitations period that some
courts had selected prior to Mulligan75 was not so well established
to have justified plaintiff's reliance on it.76 Thus, Thomas applied
Mulligan retroactively to bar the suit.
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1982). Section 1981 is the current version of § 1 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866, 14 Stat. 27, see generally Developments in the
Law-Section 1981, 15 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 29 (1980).
71. 481 U.S. 604 (1987).
72. 107 S. Ct. 2617 (1987). In Goodman the Court also held that Wilson
governs the selection of § 1981 statutes of limitations. Id. at 2620-21.
73. 818 F.2d 496 (6th Cir.), modified, 829 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1987) (on
rehearing), vacated, 109 S. Ct. 859 (1989).
74. Subsequent to Goodman and St. Francis College, the Supreme Court
in Vodila v. Clelland, 107 S. Ct. 3255 (1987), vacating 802 F.2d 460 (6th Cir.
1986) (table), vacated an unpublished Sixth Circuit decision applying the one-
year Ohio limitations period retroactively and required the Sixth Circuit to
reconsider the retroactivity issue in light of the Court's more recent decisions.
The Thomas rehearing was apparently the result of this remand, and the Sixth
Circuit ultimately applied its conclusion in Thomas to Vodila. See 836 F.2d
231 (6th Cir. 1987) (on remand).
75. See Schorle v. City of Greenhills, 524 F. Supp. 821 (S.D. Ohio 1981)
(rejecting analogous state law claim approach and selecting four-year residual
limitations period).
76. 829 F.2d at 576. The Sixth Circuit in Thomas cited a number of cases
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It now appears that the Sixth Circuit is correctly following a
case-by-case approach to the retroactivity of statutes of limitations
in section 1983 actions and is attempting to analyze such issues
under the balancing test required by Chevron and the Supreme
Court's section 1981 cases. This more flexible approach permits
courts to refuse to apply new limitations periods retroactively, 77
but the Sixth Circuit has not yet refused to apply any newly
adopted section 1983 statute of limitations retroactively. 78
C. Tolling
In Board of Regents v. Tomanio79 the Supreme Court required
federal courts entertaining section 1983 actions to look to state
law for not only the applicable limitations period but also the
appropriate tolling policies. The Tomanio Court refused to
construct a federal tolling policy but instead required federal
courts to borrow state tolling policies, as long as such policies
were not inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983.1°
to support its conclusion that the analogous cause of action approach applied
in the Sixth Circuit. See Kilgore v. City of Mansfield, 679 F.2d 632 (6th Cir.
1982); Hines v. Board of Educ., 667 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1982); Woods v. City
of Dayton, 574 F. Supp. 689, 695 (S.D. Ohio 1983), aff'd on other grounds,
734 F.2d 17 (6th Cir. 1984).
77. See Thomas, 829 F.2d at 576 n.13 ("Depending upon the particular
facts ... it is entirely possible that a factually analogous pre-Wilson [§ 19831
case decided within the Sixth Circuit established a clear precedent upon which
the plaintiff could have relied, thereby precluding the retroactive application
of Mulligan."). This formulation, however, seems to focus on factual identity
of the cases and ignores the possibility that the Sixth Circuit's analogous cause
of action approach could also have justified a plaintiff's reliance on a longer
limitations period.
78. But see Carlisle v. TRW, Inc., 860 F.2d 1078 (6th Cir. 1988) (unpub-
lished disposition) (refusing to apply one-year Ohio limitations period retroac-
tively to § 1981 claim to which a six-year limitations period had previously
applied). The Carlisle court relied upon the statement in Demery v. City of
Youngstown, 818 F.2d 1257, 1264 (6th Cir. 1987), that the one-year Ohio
limitations period should not be applied retroactively "where this decision
would mandate the application of a shorter limitations period than had pre-
viously been applied in § 1981 actions."
79. 446 U.S. 478 (1980).
80. Id. at 483-86. In addition to the § 1983 purposes of compensation and
deterrence, see Robertson v. Wegmann, 436 U.S. 584, 590-91 (1978), the
Tomanio Court examined whether considerations of federalism or uniformity
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The Sixth Circuit has decided an important case applying
tolling policies to section 1983 prison litigation. Higley v.
Michigan Department of Corrections"1 involved a Michigan statute
that tolled the limitations period for persons who were
incarcerated at the time their claims accrued. 82 In addressing the
application of this policy to section 1983 litigation, the Sixth
Circuit initially found federal law to be deficient and looked to
state law.13 The court then concluded that the policy reasons
behind the Michigan tolling policy were no longer applicable to
section 1983 prison litigation and thus rejected the state policy
as inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983.
In taking this position and dismissing the action as not timely,
the Sixth Circuit in Higley followed the lead of a number of
district courts in Ohio.8 These decisions, however, are inconsistent
with the position taken by other federal appellate courts that
have addressed the issue since the Supreme Court decision in
Tomanio. For example, in Bailey v. Faulkner85 the Seventh
Circuit acknowledged that prisoners could now file section 1983
and other civil actions and that tolling policies for incarcerated
required federal courts to reject a state policy that did not toll the limitations
period for plaintiffs who filed § 1983 actions after having presented state law
claims to state courts. 446 U.S. at 489-92.
81. 835 F.2d 623 (6th Cir. 1987).
82. See MICH. Comu,. LAws § 600.5851(1) (1987). The Michigan courts have
upheld this provision despite the changed circumstances of prisoners. See
Hawkins v. Justin, 109 Mich. App. 743, 311 N.W.2d 465 (1981).
83. Federal courts borrowing state policies under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, the
federal choice of law statute, are required to engage in a three-step process.
Under Burnett v. Grattan, 468 U.S. 42, 47-48 (1984), courts first determine
whether federal law is deficient. If it is, courts then borrow the appropriate
state policy. Finally, at the third step of the process, courts must reject otherwise
applicable borrowed policies if such policies are inconsistent with § 1983's
purposes of compensation and deterrence. Id.
84. See, e.g., Vargas v. Jago, 636 F. Supp. 425, 429 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(refusing to apply the tolling requirements of Omo REv. CoDE ANN. § 2305.16
to § 1983 actions); Perotti v. Carty, 647 F. Supp. 39, 40 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(same), aff'd, 848 F.2d 193 (6th Cir. 1988) (unpublished disposition), vacated,
109 S. Ct. _(1989). The Ohio Court of Appeals, relying on these cases, has
also refused to apply the state tolling statute to § 1983 claims as a matter of
federal law. See Miller v. Stevens, 37 Ohio App.3d 179, 525 N.E.2d 533 (1988).
85. 765 F:2d 102 (7th Cir. 1985).
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persons were no longer necessary.86 Nonetheless, the Seventh
Circuit felt bound to follow Tomanio and applied the state
tolling policies for incarcerated persons . 7
The Sixth Circuit in Higley took a different path. In so doing,
however, the court ignored the standards the Supreme Court
had applied in Tomanio to determine when borrowed state
policies are inconsistent with the purposes of section 1983. The
Higley court did not analyze the impact of the tolling policy on
either compensation or deterrence.88 Nor did it analyze or even
discuss the issue the Seventh Circuit in Bailey had found
dispositive- namely the duty of lower courts to follow decisions
of the Supreme Court.8 9 Rather the Sixth Circuit in Higley
simply substituted its views for those of both the state legislature
and the Supreme Court and pronounced the state tolling policy
to be inconsistent with federal law. 90
86. Id. at 103 (describing a since-repealed Indiana tolling provision as
"hopelessly archaic in an era when the ready access of prisoners to the courts,
state and federal, is constitutionally guaranteed").
87. Accord Miller v. Smith, 625 F.2d 43, 44 (5th Cir. 1980).
88. A proper analysis of this issue requires courts to ask whether the state
policy of tolling the limitations period for incarcerated persons either overcom-
pensates prisoners for their injuries or overdeters defendants, in this case prison
officials, from properly enforcing the law. Cf. Robertson v. Wegmann, 436
U.S. 584, 592-93 (1978) (finding Louisiana abatement policy to not affect the
§ 1983 goal of compensation or have a marginal influence on the behavior of
public officials).
89. In refusing to apply the Michigan tolling policy, the Higley court
"distinguished" Austin v. Brammer, 555 F.2d 142 (6th Cir. 1977) (per curiam),
by noting that Austin had "assum[ed] possible applica[tion] of Ohio's tolling
statute." Higley v. Michigan Dep't of Corrections, 835 F.2d 623, 625 (6th Cir.
1987). In Austin, however, the Sixth Circuit applied the Ohio tolling policy
and reversed a statute of limitations dismissal because of the failure of the
district court to hold an evidentiary hearing to determine whether the plaintiff
had been in custody within the meaning of the tolling statute. 555 F.2d at 143-
44. Although the Austin court did "assume" that the applicable tolling statute
was consistent with federal law, that conclusion was necessary to the decision.
90. In Hardin v. Straub, 109 S. Ct. 1998 (1989), rev'g 836 F.2d 549 (6th
Cir. 1987) (unpublished disposition), the Supreme Court unanimously reversed
a Sixth Circuit case that followed Higley and held that federal courts were
required to apply state tolling policies to § 1983 suits brought by incarcerated
prisoners.
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III. PRECLUSION
Federal courts entertaining section 1983 actions are required
by the Full Faith and Credit Statute1 to give state court judgments
the same preclusive effect that the courts of the forum state
would give them.9 2 Thus, federal court preclusion cases often
involve determining how the state courts would have decided
the preclusion issues, and most Sixth Circuit cases during the
period under study simply attempted to apply state policies. 93
The Sixth Circuit, however, has a tendency to ignore state
preclusion principles in favor of federal policies that limit access
to federal courts because of earlier state court proceedings.
A. Election of Remedies
The most unusual preclusion case of the period was Campbell
v. City of Allen Parkl in which the Sixth Circuit applied a
federal election of remedies doctrine to deny a section 1983
plaintiff access to federal court. Although Campbell does not
purport to be a preclusion case, the court relied on preclusion
principles to prevent the plaintiff from litigating a section 1983
91. 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1982).
92. See Migra v. Warren City School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 465 U.S. 75, 80-
85 (1984) (claim preclusion); Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 105 (1980) (issue
preclusion). See also University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788 (1986)
(following the federal common law and requiring federal courts in § 1983
actions to give state agency factfinding the same preclusive effect state courts
would give such factfinding).
93. See, e.g., Nelson v. Jefferson County, Ky., 863 F.2d 18, 19-20 (6th
Cir. 1988) (applying Kentucky law of administrative res judicata to give
preclusive effect to factual findings of unreviewed administrative proceeding);
Barnes v. McDowell, 848 F.2d 725, 730-32 (6th Cir. 1988) (applying Kentucky
principles of issue preclusion), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 789 (1989); Pilarowski
v. Macomb County Health Dep't, 841 F.2d 1281, 1286-87 (6th Cir.) (treating
unreviewed factual determinations of Michigan Employment Relations Com-
mission as binding in subsequent § 1983 action), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 133
(1988); Gutierrez v. Lynch, 826 F.2d 1534, 1537-38 (6th Cir. 1987) (applying
Ohio definition of cause of action to treat § 1983 claims for pre-termination
and post-termination hearings as same cause of action). But see Wicker v.
Board of Educ. of Knott County, Ky., 826 F.2d 442, 445-47 (6th Cir. 1987)
(applying federal principles to permit claim splitting by plaintiff who filed an
England "reservation" in state court after federal court abstention).
94. 829 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1987).
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claim without asking whether state law required her to join her
section 1983 claim in an earlier state court proceeding.
Campbell was a federal court section 1983 action in Michigan
by a female municipal employee, who was discharged under a
municipal residency requirement after she moved outside the
city to live with her husband. Prior to commencing her federal
court action,95 the employee appealed the denial of her request
for an exemption to a Michigan state court, which held that the
Commission had erred for reasons independent of the
constitutionality of the residency requirement. The state court
awarded her back pay and remanded the reinstatement issue,
and the city subsequently granted her an exemption.
Despite her success in state court, the employee and her
husband continued to pursue their federal court section 1983
claim for emotional damages and attorney fees. The district
court granted summary judgment for the defendant, concluding
that the city had not violated the plaintiffs' equal protection or
substantive due process rights.96
On appeal, the Sixth Circuit became an active participant in
the litigation. At oral argument, the court called attention to
Punton v. City of Seattle,9 a recent Ninth Circuit decision that
precluded a public employee who had been reinstated in a state
court proceeding from seeking additional relief in federal court.
After receiving supplemental briefs,98 the Sixth Circuit in a
unanimous opinion written by Judge David A. Nelson held that
once the worker was reinstated with an award of back pay she
was not free to pursue her other federal claims. In reaching this
95. The employee's husband, who ironically was employed by a neighboring
city that also had a residency requirement, was a co-plaintiff in the federal
court but not the state court action.
96. Id. at 578.
97. 805 F.2d 1378 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1029 (1987).
98. The City of Allen Park did not raise a preclusion or election of remedies
defense in its answer and, in response to the Sixth Circuit's request for
supplemental briefing, conceded that, unlike Punton, the state and federal
claims in Campbell involved different legal issues. 829 F.2d at 579. Nonetheless,
the city observed that if Punton "is extended to ... situations involving
different issues, which, however, lead to substantially the same type of damages,
then it arguably would be applicable," but cited no supporting authority. Id.
at 579-80.
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conclusion, the Sixth Circuit relied on the following language
from Punton:
Punton's election to proceed initially in the state court amounted
to a splitting of his cause of action as well as an election of
remedies. At the start, he could have proceeded directly in federal
court with a § 1983 claim for reinstatement, back pay, and general
damages. Instead, he first chose to seek the relief of reinstatement
and back pay in the state court.
We recently held in an employment grievance case originating in
California that claim preclusion arising from a state court man-
damus action in which substantial but incomplete relief was granted
barred relitigation of the claim in federal court under § 1983.
Clark v. Yosemite Community College District, 785 F.2d 781 (9th
Cir. 1986).
Another instructive case is that of a police officer in Philadelphia
who was charged with a crime, discharged from his job, acquitted
after trial, and upon application to the municipal Civil Service
Commission, reinstated without back pay. Cohen v. City of
Philadelphia, 736 F.2d 81 (3d Cir. 1984). The commissions found
that whether or not Cohen had participated in the burglary for
which he was acquitted, he had violated police department rules
by lending money to a superior officer. Cohen thereupon sued in
federal court, alleging a § 1983 claim. Summary judgment for the
city was affirmed on the basis of claim preclusion.
We have found no Supreme Court case holding that merely
because litigation strategy and the perceived advantages of a more
adequate award in federal court make it an attractive alternative,
a person aggrieved by official state action can abandon a remedy
that colorably satisfies due process of law in the state court after
recovering substantially what he had lost. On the contrary, Migra
v. Warren City School District Board of Education, 465 U.S. 75,
85, 104 S. Ct. 892, 898, 79 L.Ed.2d 56 (1984), instructs to the
contrary.Y
In attempting to distinguish Punton, the plaintiffs in Campbell
argued that the constitutionality of the denial of a waiver could
99. 829 F.2d at 579 (quoting Punton, 805 F.2d at 1381-83).
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not have been litigated in the state court proceeding. The Sixth
Circuit expressed doubt as to that proposition, pointing out that
constitutional claims may be asserted in appeals from Fire and
Police Civil Service Commission decisions. 00 In taking this
position, however, the court confused the making of an argument
with the assertion of a claim, an important distinction in this
case. There is little question that the employee could have raised
a constitutional argument in her appeal of the commission
decision, and the Michigan courts would have been required
under the supremacy clause to apply federal law.10' The relevant
issue, however, was whether the employee was required under
state law to join her separate claim for damages in the special
judicial review proceedings, but the Sixth Circuit did not address
this question. 0 2
The decision in Campbell is confusing. At one point the Sixth
Circuit observed that federal courts were limited to deciding real
100. Id. at 580. See Shelby Township Fire Dep't v. Shield, 115 Mich. App.
98, 105, 320 N.W.2d 306, 309 (1982) (discharged firefighter permitted to make
a fourteenth amendment argument).
101. See U.S. CONST., art. VI.
102. The Second Circuit approaches this issue in § 1983 damage cases in
New York by asking whether § 1983 plaintiffs could have recovered damages
in earlier completed Article 78 proceedings to review actions of governmental
agencies. See Davidson v. Capuano, 792 F.2d 275, 278-79 (2d Cir. 1986)
(prisoners not entitled to damages in earlier state court proceedings). Cf.
Kirkland v. City of Peekskill, 828 F.2d 104, 109 (2d Cir. 1987) (availability of
damages in Article 78 proceeding involving employment termination justifies
application of claim preclusion to bar federal court § 1983 damage action).
Other federal circuits also follow the state law of claim preclusion in deciding
whether to bar plaintiffs from pursuing § 1983 claims in federal court for
supplementary relief beyond that sought in related state court proceedings. See,
e.g., Cimasi v. City of Fenton, Missouri, 838 F.2d 298, 299 (8th Cir. 1988)
(applying state law to preclude damage claim that could have been raised in
earlier state court injunctive proceeding); Jarrett v. Gramling, 841 F.2d 354,
357-59 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying state law to dismiss a § 1983 action that state
law required be joined with earlier mandamus proceeding); Healy v. Town of
Pembroke Park, 831 F.2d 989, 991-93 (11th Cir. 1987) (following state law
and refusing to preclude § 1983 claim for damages not available to employee
reinstated in State Public Employees Relations Commission proceeding).
The Ninth Circuit decision discussed in the language quoted from Punton,
see supra text accompanying note 99, also looks to state law. See Clark v.
Yosemite Community College Dist., 785 F.2d 781, 784 (9th Cir. 1986) (applying
California primary rights doctrine to preclude plaintiff from bringing § 1983
suit seeking additional relief after successful state court mandamus proceeding).
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not academic controversies and suggested that the constitutionality
of the discharge was moot once the plaintiff was restored with
back pay. 03 Nonetheless, the court conceded that the issue could
be heard if the claim for money damages was viable but, relying
on Punton, concluded that supplemental relief was not available.
Thus, properly read, the Campbell decision embraces a federal
election of remedies doctrine under which section 1983 plaintiffs
may not seek supplemental relief after obtaining limited relief
in state court.
The Campbell decision is seriously flawed.'°4 In purporting to
rely on Punton, the Sixth Circuit ignored the preclusion principles
upon which Punton relied. 0 Instead, the court took the Punton
election of remedies language out of context and failed to
acknowledge the relevance of the state law of preclusion. Thus,
the Campbell court never examined how Michigan courts applying
Michigan law of claim preclusion would treat an employee's
post-reinstatement suit for damages.1°6
The Sixth Circuit, however, should be more sensitive to the
borrowing principles that the Supreme Court's preclusion
decisions require federal courts to apply. For example, in Migra
103. 829 F.2d at 580.
104. Accord M. SCHWARTZ & J. KIRKLN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS,
DEFENSES, AND FEES § 9.5 (Supp. 1988).
105. Punton itself is less than a model of clarity. Although there is some
question as to whether the Ninth Circuit actually applied the Washington law
of claim preclusion or its own federal election of remedies doctrine, see 805
F.2d at 1383 n.1 (Norris, J., dissenting), the Punton court at least looked to
claim preclusion principles and asked whether Washington law permitted the
plaintiff to join his § 1983 claim for supplementary relief in the state court
proceeding. Punton, therefore, is nothing more than a somewhat unusual
application of the borrowing principles that determine the preclusive effect of
state court judgments in subsequent federal court proceedings.
106. Had the Sixth Circuit applied Michigan law of claim preclusion, it is
unlikely that it would have reached the same conclusion. Although Michigan
maintains a unique compulsory joinder of claims policy, see MICH. COURT
RuLE 2.203(A)(1) (1986), Michigan requires an opponent to object by pleading,
by motion, or at a pretrial conference to the failure to join all claims. The
failure to raise this issue is a waiver of the defense and the "judgment ...
only merge(s) the claims actually litigated." See MICH. COURT RULE 2.203(A)(2)
(1986). Thus, under Michigan law, a party who obtained only partial relief in
a state court proceeding is not necessarily precluded from seeking supplemental
relief in a second state court proceeding.
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v. Warren City School District,10 7 a Sixth Circuit case arising in
Ohio, the district court relied on Sixth Circuit and other federal
court decisions applying both federal and state law to preclude
the plaintiff, a school administrator who had unsuccessfully
litigated a contract claim in state court, from litigating a section
1983/first amendment claim in federal court. In remanding, the
Migra Court made clear that state not federal law governed the
preclusive effect of state court judgments in subsequent federal
court proceedings.
Campbell is a prime example of judicial activism in the service
of a conservative agenda of closing the doors to the federal
courts.'l 8 The election of remedies-preclusion issue decided in
Campbell was raised by the court. This issue, however, is not
jurisdictional, and there is a substantial question as to the
propriety of courts raising such issues sua sponte.109 Moreover,
the merits of the underlying constitutional issues in Campbell
could not have been avoided because the employee's husband,
a co-plaintiff in the federal court section 1983 action, was not
a party to the earlier proceedings. Thus, the door-closing holding
of Campbell could easily have been avoided.
Campbell was also an opinion waiting for a case. An almost
identical set of events had taken place a few months earlier in
McMaster v. Cabinet for Human Resources,110 an action by
discharged Kentucky governmental employees who were reinstated
with full pay by a state agency. The McMaster plaintiffs also
sought additional relief for emotional injuries and attorney fees
in a federal court section 1983 action, and the Sixth Circuit at
107. 465 U.S. 75 (1984).
108. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 726 F.2d
1150, 1175 (7th Cir. 1984) (en banc) (Cudahy, J., dissenting) (characterizing a
similar attempt to give state court judgments a greater preclusive effect than
state courts would give them as "judicial activism in the service of judicial
abdication"), rev'd 470 U.S. 330 (1985).
109. Res judicata is expressly listed as an affirmative defense in FED. R.
Crv. P. 8(c) and election of remedies fits the classification in 8(c) of "any
other matter constituting an avoidance or affirmative defense." Thus, the
defendants' failure to raise these defenses should have constituted a waiver of
them. But see Agg v. Flanagan, 855 F.2d 336, 344 (6th Cir. 1988) (Conte, J.,
dissenting) (federal courts may raise preclusion issues sua sponte).
110. 824 F.2d 518 (6th Cir. 1987).
Spring 1989]
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 523 1988-1989
TOLEDO LA W REVIEW
oral argument raised sua sponte whether Punton precluded
relief."'
The McMaster court, however, was unwilling to accept the
federal election of remedies doctrine subsequently embraced in
Campbell."2 Nonetheless, Judge Nelson, a member of the
McMaster panel and the author of the Campbell opinion, filed
a concurring opinion. This concurring opinion in McMaster
previewed Campbell. It relied on the same quoted language from
Punton and applied a federal election of remedies doctrine to
argue that the reinstated employees should not be permitted to
seek supplemental relief in a section 1983 federal court action." 3
In response to this critique, one might argue that there should
be a federal election of remedies doctrine applicable to section
1983 actions regardless of the law of the forum state." 4 Such a
111. Id. at 524-25.
112. The Sixth Circuit decided McMaster on the substantive ground that the
dismissal could not be characterized as a malicious prosecution claim actionable
under the substantive due process protections of the fourteenth amendment.
824 F.2d at 522-23.
113. Judge Avem Cohn, a district court judge sitting by designation and the
author of the panel opinion in McMaster, responded to Judge Nelson by noting
that "[tjhere is simply no need to discuss election of remedies or claim
preclusion" since the McMaster plaintiffs had based their § 1983 claim on the
malicious initiation of charges without probable cause. Admonishing his more
activist colleague, Judge Cohn observed that the plaintiffs' "narrowly drawn
claim was an obvious effort to avoid pleading an attack on the act of dismissal
itself.... We should, and do in the majority opinion, respect the narrowness
of plaintiffs' claim." Id. at 523 n.6.
114. Election of remedies doctrines, however, are only applicable where
parties have chosen to pursue inconsistent positions, and courts generally view
them as harsh doctrines that should rarely be applied. See D. Donns, HANDBOOK
ON THE LAW OF REMEDms 13-15 (1973). Moreover, a leading federal treatise
has sharply criticized the use of "the election [of remedies] label ... to explain
decisions that today seem better explained in terms of claim preclusion." 18
C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE:
JuusDIcTIoN § 4476 (1981). See also id. ("There is no more modem need for
election [of remedies] reasoning in this area than there is in respect to the
common law forms of action."). Thus, it is unlikely that the Supreme Court
would permit the adoption of an election of remedies doctrine that so easily
permitted courts to circumvent the preclusion principles contained in 28 U.S.C.
§ 1738. But cf. University of Tenn. v. Elliott, 478 U.S. 788, 794-95 (1986)(relying on federal common law to apply a doctrine of administrative res
judicata to § 1983 litigation).
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position, however, is inconsistent with the preclusion cases under
which federal courts follow state law and may not give state
court judgments greater preclusive effect than state courts would
give them." 5
B. False Arrest Actions and Prior Convictions
The Sixth Circuit's tendency to apply preclusion principles
without regard to the law of the forum state was manifested
again in Walker v. Schaeffer' 16 in which the court applied issue
preclusion to nolo contendre pleas and guilty findings to estop
section 1983 plaintiffs from asserting that police officers acted
without probable cause in arresting and imprisoning them.
In deciding Walker, the Sixth Circuit paid lip service to Migra
and the borrowing principles that govern preclusion issues.
Although the court found that Ohio law treated guilty findings
as constituting an absolute defense in a false arrest action," 7 it
also concluded that federal law barred false arrest claims in such
circumstances. In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit
explicitly relied on Cameron v. Fogarty"' in which the Second
Circuit denied any reliance on preclusion principles in applying
the common law rule that precluded actions for false arrest or
malicious prosecution by criminal defendants who were
subsequently convicted of the underlying offenses. Although the
Walker court somehow characterized this defense as a "qualified
immunity," the Sixth Circuit really borrowed the common law
principle "that where law enforcement officers have made an
arrest, the resulting conviction is a defense to a section 1983
115. See Marrese v. American Academy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U.S.
373, 383 (1985). In Migra, Justice White addressed his argument for a policy
in which federal courts could give state court judgments greater preclusive
effect to Congress, because he saw any other position foreclosed by prior
Supreme court decisions. See 465 U.S. at 88 (White, J., concurring).
116. 854 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1988).
117. The court relied on the rarely cited fifty year old intermediate appellate
court decision, see Ryan v. Conover, 59 Ohio App. 361, 18 N.E.2d 277 (1938),
and a legal encyclopedia. See 45 Ouxo JuR.3D False Imprisonment § 10 (1983)
("A guilty finding in a criminal proceeding, whether by trial or plea, constitutes
an absolute defense to an action for false arrest or false imprisonment."). Id.
at 165.
118. 806 F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1016 (1987).
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action asserting that the arrest was made without probable
cause.'"" 9
Neither the Second nor the Sixth Circuits, however, explained
how this common law requirement found its way into the section
1983 cause of action, 120 and, most disturbingly, the Walker Court
did not address or even acknowledge its own earlier rejection
of this limitation on the scope of section 1983.121 Therefore,
even though Walker can be explained by the court's reliance on
Ohio law, the broad language in Walker may be the basis for
subsequent decisions in other states limiting the scope of section
1983 without regard to state preclusion law.
IV. IMMUNITIES
The most commonly litigated section 1983 remedial issues in
the Sixth Circuit involve the availability of immunities in
individual capacity section 1983 damage actions. This is a direct
result of Supreme Court decisions redefining the qualified
immunity and transforming it into a right to not stand trial. 22
These decisions have radically altered the nature of section 1983
damage litigation by thrusting the immunity issue to the forefront
of litigation, by limiting discovery, and by permitting interlocutory
appeals of decisions rejecting immunity defenses.
119. 854 F.2d at 143 (quoting Cameron, 806 F.2d at 388-89).
120. See infra notes 152-56 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
use of common law principles to define § 1983 claims. Nor did the Second or
Sixth Circuits even acknowledge Haring v. Prosise, 462 U.S. 306 (1983), in
which the Supreme Court applied state preclusion principles to permit a § 1983
damage action for an illegal search after a guilty plea.
121. In Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231 (6th Cir. 1968) (per curiam),
the Sixth Circuit refused to dismiss a § 1983 false arrest complaint because the
plaintiff was later convicted. Although the court ultimately dismissed the case
on statute of limitations grounds, it first ruled that a criminal conviction did
not mandate dismissal, stating that "the simple fact of an unreversed state
court conviction cannot by itself require dismissal [of a civil rights action]."
Id. at 233. Accord Brown v. Edwards, 721 F.2d 1442, 1448 n.8 (5th Cir. 1984);
Greer v. Turner, 603 F.2d 521, 522 (5th Cir. 1979); Guerro v. Mulhearn, 498
F.2d 1249, 1254 (1st Cir. 1974). Cf. Singleton v. Perry, 45 Cal.2d 489, 492,
289 P.2d 794, 798 (1955) (conviction does not prevent suit for false arrest
under state law).
122. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-27 (1985); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-19 (1982).
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The federal courts, including the Sixth Circuit, have been
addressing three principal clusters of immunity issues. First,
courts are continuing to review the functions performed by
various public officials to determine whether such officials are
entitled to absolute or qualified immunities. Second, courts are
struggling with how to approach immunity issues at trial and in
interlocutory appeals. Finally, courts are being forced to decide
on limited factual records quasi-substantive issues involving
whether the federal constitutional rights at issue were "clearly
established" when actions accrued. 123
A. The Threshold Question: Determining the Applicable
Immunity
The Supreme Court has held that the common law absolute
immunity from damage suits available to judges and legislators
was not abrogated by section 1983'2 and has applied a functional
test to determine when public officials are entitled to an absolute
immunity. Thus, judges acting within their jurisdiction to perform
judicial acts have an absolute immunity, 25 but judges acting in
an administrative capacity to make hiring decisions do not. 26
Likewise, prosecutors performing prosecutorial functions are
sufficiently close to the judicial process to entitle them to an
absolute immunity, 127 but prosecutors engaged in purely
investigative law enforcement activities have only the qualified
immunity available to police officers.1 28
During the two-year period under study, the Sixth Circuit
decided several cases involving the threshold question of which
123. Although § 1983 is available to enforce federal statutory claims, see
Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418, 429-30
(1987); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 4-8 (1980), qualified immunity issues
also arise, albeit rarely, in cases not involving constitutional claims.
124. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967) judges); Tenney v. Brandhove,
341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951) (legislators).
125. See Stump v. Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 355-57 (1978).
126. See Forrester v. White, 108 S. Ct. 538, 544-46 (1988).
127. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 427 (1976).
128. See Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 631-33 (7th Cir. 1979), rev'd
in part on other grounds, 446 U.S. 754 (1980). See also Joseph v. Patterson,
795 F.2d 549, 555-57 (6th Cir. 1986) (refusing to apply Imbler to certain
investigative activities), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1023 (1987).
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immunity was available to particular defendants. Most of these
cases involved whether officials were entitled to an absolute
immunity from section 1983 damage awards, but one involved
the application of immunity principles to private defendants
acting under color of state law.
1. Public Officials
In Sparks v. Character and Fitness Committee of Kentucky' 29
the Sixth Circuit addressed whether judicial and other defendants
in a section 1983 action by an unsuccessful applicant to the
Kentucky bar were entitled to absolute judicial immunity. Relying
on federal court cases, the Sixth Circuit classified the act of
passing on the credentials of bar applicants as a judicial act
when performed by a judge, thus entitling the Chief Justice of
the Kentucky Supreme Court to absolute judicial immunity.130
The court then held that quasi-judicial acts performed by non-
judicial officials with delegated responsibility for the bar
admission process were part of the judicial process and
functionally equivalent to judicial duties, thus entitling members
of the committee and staff that administer the admission process
to absolute judicial immunity.
Sparks was decided shortly before the Supreme Court, in
Forrester v. White,13' applied a functional test to deny a judge
an absolute immunity for the non-judicial administrative act of
firing a probation officer. Consequently, the Court remanded
Sparks for further consideration in light of Forrester, but the
Sixth Circuit adhered to its earlier decision granting judges and
129. 818 F.2d 541 (6th Cir. 1987), vacated, 108 S. Ct. 744 (1988), adhered
to on remand, 859 F.2d 428 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1120
(1989).
130. 818 F.2d at 543. The Sixth Circuit relied on Chief Justice Taney's
statement that "it has been well settled, by the rules and practice of common-
law courts, that it rests exclusively with the court to determine who is qualified
to become one of its officers, as an attorney and counsellor, and for what
cause he ought to be removed." Id. (quoting Ex parte Secombe, 60 U.S. (19
How.) 9, 13 (1856)). The court also looked to state law and observed that the
Kentucky Constitution charged the Kentucky Supreme Court with the duty to
"govern admission to the bar and the discipline of members of the bar." Ky.
CONST. § 116 (1976).
131. 108 S. Ct. 538 (1988).
[Vol.20
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 528 1988-1989
Spring 1989] SECTION 1983 529
other persons in the bar admission process an absolute
immunity.12
In taking this position, the Sixth Circuit relied on the
availability of an appeal process for reviewing adverse decisions
on bar admission, 33 the Supreme Court's grant of judicial
immunity for disbarment proceedings,1 4 and the traditional
responsibility of courts for determining bar membership.
In Shelly v. Johnson'35 the Sixth Circuit addressed the immunity
of prison hearing officers. In Cleavinger v. Saxner'3 6 the Supreme
Court had denied members of an Indiana prison disciplinary
committee an absolute judicial immunity because they did not
perform a classic adjudicatory function and lacked the
independence and neutrality associated with judges or others
performing judicial functions. In Shelly, however, the Sixth
Circuit concluded that state law gave prison hearing officers in
Michigan the type of independence and responsibility that was
consistent with adjudicatory functions. Thus, the Shelly court
held that the defendants were entitled to absolute immunity
from suits by inmates for actions taken as hearing officers.
In Alioto v. City of Shively, Kentucky3 7 the court addressed
an issue left open in Briscoe v. LaHue, as and held that police
officers who testify before grand juries are entitled to absolute
immunity despite the allegations of a conspiracy to give false
and incomplete testimony.
In White v. Gerbitz3 9 in an alternative holding the Sixth
Circuit extended absolute immunity to the prosecutors responsible
132. 859 F.2d 428 (6th Cir.), on remand from 108 S. Ct. 744 (1988). See
also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416, 417-18 (6th Cir. 1988) (holding that a
municipal court clerk responsible for the non-distrectionary act of issuing a
warrant performed a judicial function to which absolute immunity attached).
133. 859 F.2d at 433. In Forrester the Supreme Court pointed to the absence
of an appeal process to justify denying judges an absolute immunity for
employment decisions. 108 S. Ct. at 544.
134. See Bradley v. Fisher, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 335, 354-56 (1871) (providing
absolute judicial immunity in a case involving the disbarment of an attorney).
135. 849 F.2d 228 (6th Cir. 1988).
136. 474 U.S. 193 (1985).
137. 835 F.2d 1173 (6th Cir. 1987).
138. 460 U.S. 325, 329 n.5 (1983).
139. 860 F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1988).
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for the plaintiff's arrest and incarceration for 288 days as a
"material witness" but denied both an absolute and a qualified
immunity to the prosecutor who failed to act in a timely fashion
to secure the plaintiff's release after the court ordered him to
work out the details of the release.
Finally, in Haskell v. Washington Township, 40 the Sixth
Circuit reversed an earlier decision 4' and held that in light of
Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency'42
local legislators are entitled to absolute immunity insofar as they
are acting in a legislative capacity. Nonetheless, the court ruled
that administrative activities, including enforcing zoning
ordinances, are only subject to a qualified immunity. Moreover,
the court noted that "absolute immunity does not extend to
even traditionally legislative actions of officials taken either in
bad faith, because of corruption, or primarily in furtherance of
personal instead of public interests.' ' 43
2. Private Defendants
One of the most interesting immunity cases decided during
this period by the Sixth Circuit was Duncan v. Peck. 44 This
was the latest chapter in a protracted dispute involving a section
1983 claim against a private party who used an unconstitutional
Ohio proceeding to attach the plaintiff's property. Section 1983
was available under Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co.,'14 which
liberally construed the "color of law" requirement in cases
involving joint participation, and the immunity issue was whether
the private defendant could claim a qualified immunity based
on his reliance on his attorney's advice about the constitutionality
of the state attachment proceeding.'*s
140. 864 F.2d 1266 (6th Cir. 1988).
141. Nelson v. Knox, 256 F.2d 312, 314-15 (6th Cir. 1958).
142. 404 U.S. 391 (1979).
143. 864 F.2d at 1278.
144. 844 F.2d 1261 (6th Cir. 1988).
145. 457 U.S. 922 (1982).
146. Lugar had expressly reserved whether private defendants were entitled
to a qualified immunity. Id. at 942 n.23.
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Noting the split in the circuits, 147 the Sixth Circuit held that
there is no qualified immunity for private defendants in section
1983 actions. Nonetheless, the court distinguished the objective
qualified immunity available in section 1983 actions from a fact-
specific subjective "good faith defense" 1 and concluded that
the common law good faith defense to malicious prosecution
and wrongful attachment actions should be available in section
1983 suits. Thus, the court held that parties who rely in good
faith on the advice of their attorneys to invoke presumptively
valid state statutes have a good faith defense. 149
At first blush, there may not seem to be any difference
between the qualified immunity that the Sixth Circuit rejected
and the good faith defense it found available, but the distinction
is really quite important in the conduct of section 1983 litigation.
An immunity entitles a defendant to avoid standing trial,"10 but
a good faith defense is simply one of a number of defenses that
a defendant may raise at trial.' 5' Moreover, an immunity that
is rejected by a trial court may be the subject of an interlocutory
appeal, but a defendant who fails to secure the dismissal of an
action based on a good faith or other affirmative defense must
stand trial and is not entitled to an interlocutory appeal on the
validity of the defense.
The use of a good faith defense borrowed from state law also
raises questions about the use of state law to define the elements
of the section 1983 cause of action. In looking to state tort law
for available defenses, the Sixth Circuit assumed, as it has in
147. Compare Howerton v. Gabica, 708 F.2d 380, 385 n.10 (9th Cir. 1983)
(rejecting good faith immunity); Downs v. Sawtelle, 574 F.2d 1 (1st Cir.)
(same), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 910 (1978), with Folsom Inv. Co. v. Moore,
681 F.2d 1032, 1037 (5th Cir. 1982) (applying good faith immunity); Buller v.
Buechler, 706 F.2d 844, 850-52 (8th Cir. 1983) (same). The Sixth Circuit also
relied on an Eleventh Circuit decision applying a qualified immunity, a position
subsequently embraced by the full Eleventh Circuit in Jones v. Preuit &
Mauldin, 851 F.2d 1321, 1323-28 (lth Cir. 1988) (en banc), vacated on other
grounds, 109 S. Ct. 1105 (1989).
148. 844 F.2d at 1266-67.
149. Id. at 1267-68.
150. See Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 525-26 (1985).
151. The Sixth Circuit in Duncan noted that courts that had approved the
use of a qualified immunity had done so because of their conclusion that
private defendants were entitled to a good faith defense. 844 F.2d at 1266.
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its malicious prosecution cases, 5 2 that the elements of various
common law torts have somehow been incorporated into
constitutional claims actionable under section 1983. This approach
to defining the elements of a section 1983 cause of action, which
may sometimes expand and sometimes restrict the section 1983
cause of action, ignores the fact that section 1983 itself confers
no rights and that a necessary condition of a viable section 1983
action is a violation of an underlying federal constitutional or
statutory right.' Moreover, the Supreme Court has repeatedly
made clear that state torts must be distinguished from
constitutional rights. 54 Thus, in Baker v. McCollan,'"1 in holding
that the mere allegation of false imprisonment did not rise to a
constitutional violation, the Court noted that
[s]ection 1983 imposes liability for violations of rights protected
by the Constitution, for violations of duties of care arising out
of tort law. Remedy for the latter type of injury must be sought
in state court under traditional tort-law principles. Just as
"[m]edical malpractice does not become a constitutional violation
merely because the victim is a prisoner," . . . false imprisonment
does not become a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment merely
because the defendant is a state official. 56
Thus, for section 1983 to be available, there must be a violation
of federal law, and conduct by public officials that meets state
152. See Coogan v. City of Wixom, 820 F.2d 170, 174 (6th Cir. 1987). The
Supreme Court has not decided the extent to which state law defines elements
of a § 1983 claim based on malicious prosecution. See Conway v. Village of
Mt. Kisco, 750 F.2d 205 (2d Cir. 1984), adhered to, 758 F.2d 46, 49 (2d Cir.
1985), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted sub nom. Cerbone v. Conway,
479 U.S. 84 (1986). See generally M. SCHWARTZ & J. KreKLiN, supra note 104,
at § 3.6 (1986 & 1988 Supp.).
153. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Org., 441 U.S. 600, 617
(1979).
154. See Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693, 701 (1976) (rejecting a broad reading
of the fourteenth amendment that would make it "a font of tort law to be
superimposed upon whatever systems may already be administered by the
States").
155. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
156. Id. at 146.
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definitions of such common law torts as assault and battery,
false arrest, false imprisonment, defamation, or malicious
prosecution does not, standing alone, constitute a constitutional
violation actionable through section 1983.
Likewise, state definitions of common law torts should not
be used to limit the definition of the constitutional violations
actionable through section 1983. The Sixth Circuit in Duncan,
however, did not explain why elements of common law torts
should be incorporated into section 1983 when it approved the
use of an element of the analogous common law cause of action
as a subjective good faith defense.
Finally, the application of this good faith defense to section
1983 actions against private defendants may have implications
that the Sixth Circuit did not address. Qualified immunity
defenses in section 1983 action are based on objective factors,
but the good faith defense approved in Duncan is based on
subjective factors, thus making summary judgment less likely
and opening defendants' state of mind to discovery.'1 This will
present practical problems for defendants in cases such as Duncan
in which the asserted good faith defense is based on reliance on
the advice of counsel. The assertion of such a defense, for
example, will subject defendants to some very uncomfortable
discovery. Thus, the Duncan plaintiff should be able to learn
what legal advice was provided by the attorney who represented
the private defendant in the original attachment proceeding.1 8
Moreover, the attorney on whose advice the defendant relied
(and who will also be subject to discovery) may not be able to
represent any of the defendants in the section 1983 action.5 9
157. See infra notes 222-27 and accompanying text (discussing relationship
between unlawful motive and qualified immunity).
158. Prior to Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982), the assertion of a
subjective good faith defense based on advice of counsel was treated by some
courts as a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, thus subjecting defendants
to discovery concerning the legal advice they received. See, e.g., Hearn v.
Rhay, 68 F.R.D. 574, 578 (E.D. Wash. 1975).
159. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.7(a)(3) (1983) (not
requiring disqualification of lawyer-witness where disqualification would work
"substantial hardship on the client"); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPON-
smn.rry DR-5-102(B) (1981) (permitting lawyer-witness "to continue the repre-
sentation until it is apparent that his testimony is or may be prejudicial to his
client").
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B. Method: Administering the New Qualified Immunities
The Sixth Circuit has also decided a number of important
decisions that help clarify how trial and appellate courts should
approach immunity claims in section 1983 litigation.
1. Interlocutory Appeals
The federal judicial system, as contrasted to some state judicial
systems, does not favor interlocutory appeals,16° but there have
long been both statutory and judge-made exceptions to the final
judgment rule.16 ' The final judgment rule, however, is no longer
the prevailing policy in federal courts for section 1983 immunity
issues.
Although interlocutory appeals of decisions denying motions
to dismiss or motions for summary judgment are generally not
available, the Supreme Court in Mitchell v. Forsyth'62 construed
the "collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule 63
broadly to permit defendants to file immediate appeals of
decisions that deny them absolute immunities and force them
to go to trial.'6 In addition, the Mitchell Court held that
160. See generally R. MARTlEAU, MODERN APPELLATE PRAICE § 4 (1983
& Supp. 1987).
161. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (defining permissible interlocutory appeals).
See also infra note 163.
162. 472 U.S. 511 (1985). See also Nixon v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 731, 742-
43 (1982).
163. Under this exception, a small class of interlocutory orders are imme-
diately appealable when they (1) present serious and unsettled questions, see
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541, 547 (1949); and (2)
"conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an important issue
completely separate from the merits of the action, and . . . [are] effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay,
437 U.S. 463, 468 (1978) (citing Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658
(1977); and United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 855 (1978)).
164. By treating immunity defenses as giving certain defendants a right to
avoid standing trial rather than a defense to be asserted at trial, the Court has
justified not only the expanded use of interlocutory appeals but also limitations
on discovery. See Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 819 (1982). But see
Anderson v. Creighton, 107 S. Ct. 3034, 3042 (1987) (describing qualified
immunity as "fact-specific" and permitting limited immunity-related discovery).
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interlocutory appeals are also available when a qualified immunity
"turns on an issue of law.' ' 65
Mitchell, however, left the lower federal courts with a range
of unanswered questions on how to approach immunity and
related issues. For example, Mitchell left open whether
interlocutory appeals of immunity issues are available when
injunctive relief is sought in addition to damages. 166 Since the
relevant immunities, both absolute and qualified, protect
defendants from standing trial, defendants against whom
injunctive relief is sought will have to stand trial regardless of
the presence of immunity defenses. Thus, some courts do not
permit such defendants to file interlocutory appeals to review
denials of immunity.1 67
There is also a great deal of uncertainty as to how courts
should apply Mitchell, and the Sixth Circuit seems acutely aware
of the spectre of multiple interlocutory appeals on immunity
issues. Consequently, in a series of section 1983 cases, the Sixth
Circuit has addressed various aspects of administering the new
regime of qualified immunities and interlocutory appeals.
165. 472 U.S. at 530.
166. Id. at 519 n.5.
167. See Prisco v. United States Dep't of Justice, 851 F.2d 93, 96 (3d Cir.
1988) (refusing to permit interlocutory appeals on immunity issues in Bivens
actions in which defendants are sued for both damages and injunctive relief).
The Fourth Circuit, which had previously taken this position, see Bever v.
Gilbertson, 724 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 948 (1984), has
now abandoned it and permits interlocutory appeals despite the presence claims
for injunctive relief. See Young v. Lynch, 846 F.2d 960, 962-63 (4th Cir. 1988).
The Sixth Circuit, however, approved the availability of interlocutory appeals
in such circumstances in Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir.
1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
The exposure to personal liability in damages and the potential need for
retention of private counsel to protect against that risk is quite different
from the problem faced by an official who is charged only in an official
capacity.... We believe that the rationale of Mitchell ... should apply
equally whether only personal liability for damages is sought or whether
added relief against the defendant in his official capacity is also sought.
Id. at 306.
Other circuits that have addressed this issue also permit interlocutory appeals
in these circumstances. See M. ScnwARTz & J. KnucuN, supra note 104, §
7.18 (Supp. 1988), and cases cited therein.
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In Kennedy v. City of Cleveland,'6 a 1986 case, the Sixth
Circuit, in reaffirming the power of trial courts to set time
limits for managing litigation, was fully aware that those time
limits could restrict the availability of interlocutory appeals.
Noting the "delay and inconvenience" to the plaintiff and to
the court caused by even "good faith" interlocutory appeals of
immunity issues, the court applied "the same rules of waiver
and procedural default as have been traditionally applied to
other cases. ' 169
Because immunities, whether qualified or absolute, are
affirmative defenses that may be waived, 70 the Sixth Circuit in
Kennedy reasoned that defendants may be required to assert
their immunities at various stages of the proceedings in order
to take full advantage of the protections that flow from such
immunities.
For example, defendants may raise immunity defenses in
motions to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. 7' Normally, 12(b)(6) motions can be made at
any time, 72 but the Kennedy court approved trial judges'
"establish[ing] a time for the filing of motions challenging the
sufficiency of the pleadings, during which discovery will be
stayed unless good cause can be shown to the contrary.' 7
Thus, the court limited the ability of defendants to use motions
to dismiss to cut off discovery. 74 Likewise, the Kennedy court
applied the 30-day time limit for filing appeals under Rule 4(a)
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure to interlocutory appeals
and held that "if the order is appealable at all, it must be
appealed within the time set by law, ... or the right must be
considered to have been waived.' 1 75
168. 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 1103 (1987).
169. Id. at 300.
170. See Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635 (1980).
171. Although the Court has expressed a preference for resolving immunity
issues on summary judgment, see Harlow, 457 U.S. at 815-19, such defenses
may also be raised in motions to dismiss. See, Martin v. City of Eastlake, 686
F. Supp. 620, 627 (N.D. Ohio 1988).
172. See FED. R. Civ. P. 12(h)(2).
173. 797 F.2d at 300.
174. Id. at 301.
175. Id.
[Vol.20
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 536 1988-1989
Spring 1989] SECTION 1983 537
Because defendants may file interlocutory appeals when
motions for summary judgment on immunity grounds are denied,
the Kennedy court was faced with the possibility of approving
the availability of multiple interlocutory appeals. In Kennedy
the trial court denied a motion for summary judgment arguably
based on immunity grounds, and the defendants did not seek
interlocutory review. 76 Subsequently, one of the defendants filed
a supplemental motion for summary judgment, but the trial
court struck that motion as not timely. The issue posed by the
supplemental motion for summary judgment therefore was
whether it too was appealable.
In upholding the denial of the motion for summary judgment,
the Sixth Circuit deferred to the discretion of the trial court. In
taking this position, the court seemed to acknowledge that the
availability of supplemental motions for summary judgment
would, in some cases, permit defendants to take additional
interlocutory appeals. In Kennedy, however, "no new facts or
previously unavailable legal arguments were offered and no good
cause . . . [was] shown to excuse the inordinate delay" in filing
the supplemental motion for summary judgment.1 77
Nonetheless, despite the effort by the Sixth Circuit in Kennedy
to give trial courts broad power to manage section 1983 litigation
and set time limits that may restrict the availability of
interlocutory appeals, it is still possible for defendants to take
three interlocutory appeals of immunity rulings.
First, a defendant may file a motion to dismiss claiming that
the facts alleged in the complaint do not state a violation of
clearly established federal law. If that motion fails, a defendant
may file a timely interlocutory appeal under Mitchell. Second,
a defendant may test the facts in a summary judgment motion. 7 8
The trial court will then review the uncontroverted facts that
emerge from an examination of the competing affidavits to
determine whether the defendant has an immunity defense, and
the defendant may file a second interlocutory appeal if the court
176. At the time the first motion for summary judgment in Kennedy was
denied, the Supreme Court had not yet decided Mitchell, and thus it was not
clear that an interlocutory appeal was available. See id. at 304.
177. Id. at 305.
178. At this point the plaintiff may be limited to immunity-related discovery.
See supra note 164.
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rejects the immunity. 7 9 Finally, the parties may engage in full
discovery, which may develop new facts and new legal theories,
and may justify a renewed or supplemental motion for summary
judgment, the denial of which may give rise to a third
interlocutory appeal. 80
Although Kennedy seems to permit multiple interlocutory
appeals in some cases, the Sixth Circuit has attempted to place
some limits on their availability. In Sinclair v. Schriber18' the
trial court denied motions for summary judgment made by
defendant FBI agents on the basis of a qualified immunity
without prejudice and ordered discovery. The defendants appealed
from this order, but the Sixth Circuit held that an order denying
summary judgment without prejudice (and thus permitting
discovery) was not an appealable interlocutory order. 82
It is easy to understand the Sixth Circuit's discomfort at the
spectre of multiple interlocutory appeals on immunity issues.
Nonetheless, that is what the Supreme Court has wrought, and
until and unless the Court reexamines the issue, or Congress
intervenes, defendants in appropriate cases are entitled to as
many as three interlocutory appeals on the immunity issues.'83
Moreover, it is difficult to understand why an order denying
summary judgment, without prejudice, based on an immunity
defense is not immediately appealable under Mitchell. All orders
denying motions for summary judgment are without prejudice
179. A defendant who violated clearly established federal law could also
claim to fall within the Harlow "extraordinary circumstances" exception. See
infra note 193. If unsuccessful at the trial court, the defendant could include
such a claim in an interlocutory appeal. See Balcerzak, Qualified Immunity for
Government Officials: The Problem of Unconstitutional Purpose in Civil Rights
Litigation, 95 YALE L.J. 126, 145 n.74 (1985).
180. Although the law of the case will apply to prevent defendants from
obtaining review of issues previously reviewed, the shifting nature of the facts
involving both the alleged violations of law and the particular defendants'
involvement will often present different legal issues in each appeal.
181. 834 F.2d 103 (6th Cir. 1987). Sinclair was an action against FBI agents
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), but the
Supreme Court applies the immunity principles in § 1983 and Bivens actions
interchangeably. See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818 n.30; Butz v. Economou, 438
U.S. 478, 504 (1978).
182. 834 F.2d at 104-05.
183. See supra notes 178-80 and accompanying text.
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in the sense that the court has found that a genuine material
issue of fact entitles the party opposing summary judgment to
go to trial. Denials of such motions do not cut off discovery,
and when additional factual material is obtained, a party whose
motion for summary judgment was denied may generally file a
new motion for summary judgment.18 Moreover, the right to
an interlocutory appeal on an immunity issue is part and parcel
of defendants' right to be protected from discovery, and the
Sixth Circuit's decision in Sinclair to deny interlocutory review
"until after discovery is to deny a key part of their claims
irrevocably and for all time."' 85
2. Burdens and Decision-Makers
The Sixth Circuit has also addressed the allocation of the
various burdens on immunity issues and the respective roles of
the judge and jury in deciding such issues.
In Dominique v. Telb 86 the district court refused to dismiss
on immunity grounds a section 1983 damage action against a
Michigan Department of Corrections official who was sued
because of his role in filing an unlawful detainer. In reviewing
the denial of the immunity in an interlocutory appeal, the Sixth
Circuit discussed the allocation of the various burdens on the
immunity issue. The trial court had placed the burden of going
forward on the defendant once he raised the qualified immunity
defense. The Sixth Circuit reversed, noting that although qualified
immunity is an affirmative defense, plaintiffs have an initial
pleading burden of demonstrating that the defendant's alleged
conduct violated clearly established law. 87 Despite the Supreme
184. The Second Circuit takes the position that the refusal to address or
decide a motion for summary judgment is a de facto denial of the motion and
subject to an interlocutory appeal. See Francis v. Coughlin, 849 F.2d 778, 780
(2d Cir. 1988).
185. Sinclair, 834 F.2d at 106 (Nelson, J., dissenting).
186. 831 F.2d 673 (6th Cir. 1987).
187. Id. at 676. In taking this position, the Dominique court relied on
Kennedy v. City of Cleveland, 797 F.2d 297 (6th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 1103 (1987), in which the Sixth Circuit had stated that
the plaintiff must plead facts which, if true, describe a violation of a
clearly established statutory or constitutional right of which a reasonable
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Court's holding in Gomez v. Toledo"s that qualified immunity
was an affirmative defense, the Sixth Circuit treated the Court's
more recent immunity decisions as placing this pleading burden
on plaintiffs. Is9 Thus, the court effectively requires plaintiffs
who are pursuing section 1983 damage claims to forsake the
liberal notice pleading policies of the federal rules and file
complaints that contain enough facts to demonstrate that at the
time the action accrued federal law was clearly established.
The Sixth Circuit in Dominique also held that the district
court had erred in treating the qualified immunity defense as
raising a factual issue that precluded a grant of summary
judgment. 90 In Harlow v. Fitzgerald'9' the Supreme Court defined
the immunity in objective terms by asking whether a defendant
knew or should have known that his action violated the plaintiff's
clearly established federal rights. 92 This alternative formulation,
however, could be seen raising both the factual question of what
the defendant actually knew 93 and the legal question of whether
public official, under an objective standard, would have known. The
failure to so plead precludes a plaintiff from proceeding further, even
from engaging in discovery, since the plaintiff has failed to allege acts
that are outside the scope of the defendant's immunity.
Id. at 299. The Kennedy court, however, did not discuss or attempt to reconcile
its allocation of burdens with the Supreme Court decision in Gomez v. Toledo,
446 U.S. 635 (1980), but the Dominique court addressed this issue. 831 F.2d
at 677.
188. 446 U.S. 635 (1980). The Supreme Court in Gomez held that qualified
immunity was an affirmative defense that the defendant must raise. Justice
Rehnquist, however, noted that the Court did not address the allocation of the
non-pleading burdens. See id. at 642 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
189. Prior to Kennedy and Dominique, the Sixth Circuit had also held that
the burden of proof on affirmative defenses rested with the defendants. See
Alexander v. Alexander, 706 F.2d 751 (6th Cir. 1983); Wolfel v. Sanborn, 666
F.2d 1005 (6th Cir.), vacated on other grounds, 458 U.S. 1102 (1982). Kennedy
and Dominique, however, appear to have placed that burden on plaintiffs
without addressing or even citing the earlier decisions by other Sixth Circuit
panels.
190. 831 F.2d at 677.
191. 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
192. See id. at 819.
193. This is not a subjective question as to the defendant's motivation but
rather an objective, fact-specific question as to what the defendant knew. Under
540 [Vol.20
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the law was sufficiently clearly established at the time the action
accrued so as to impute knowledge of the law to the defendant.
Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit in Dominique, held that the
qualified immunity defense only raises "the purely legal question
of whether the law at the time of the alleged action was clearly
established in favor of the plaintiff."194 Thus, Dominique makes
clear that courts, not juries, are to decide the legal question of
whether the law was clearly established. 195
The Sixth Circuit has also made clear that courts deciding a
qualified immunity issue may not limit their review to the
pleadings. For example, in Poe v. Haydon'96 the depositions
contained undisputed facts, and the Sixth Circuit held that a
trial court erred by limiting its inquiry on the immunity issue
to the pleadings and by not reviewing the deposition testimony. 97
3. Underlying Rights v. Defendants' Involvement
The Supreme Court in Anderson v. Creighton198 stated that
the focus of the immunity inquiry is not the abstract right but
a more particularized right, "[tihe contours [of which] ... must
be sufficiently clear that a reasonable official would understand
that what he is doing violates that right."' 99 Nonetheless, it is
still sometimes unclear whether courts approaching immunity
Harlow, in "extraordinary circumstances" the defendant may introduce sub-
jective factors to temper the objective test and show that "he neither knew
nor should have known of the relevant legal standard." Id.
194. 831 F.2d at 676.
195. Nonetheless, under the requirements of the seventh amendment, the
jury is responsible for resolving the underlying factual issues on which immu-
nities depend.
196. 853 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 788 (1989).
197. 853 F.2d at 426. Thus, the Sixth Circuit joins the Seventh Circuit,
which in Green v. Carlson, 826 F.2d 647 (7th Cir. 1987), looked to the
uncontested or uncontroverted facts in the interlocutory appeal. This position
rejects the decision of the First Circuit in Bonitz v. Fair, 804 F.2d 164 (1st
Cir. 1986), but the First Circuit itself appears to be reexamining its position.
See Mendez-Palov v. Rohena-Bentacourt, 813 F.2d 1255, 1259-60 (1st Cir.
1987) (permitting review of uncontested facts where plaintiff's allegations are
sketchy).
198. 107 S. Ct. 3034 (1987).
199. Id. at 3039.
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issues should focus on the underlying federal rights (and whether
they are clearly established) or on the involvement of the
defendants in the allegedly illegal activity.
This problem, which also exists for trial courts, arose in
Ramirez v. Webb, 200 a Bivens action against Federal Immigration
and Naturalization Service agents based on an allegedly illegal
search. The trial court denied the defendants' motions for
summary judgment based on qualified immunity, but the Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that the search warrant did not violate
clearly established federal law governing the specificity of the
persons or places to be searched. Thus, the agents who
participated in the search were entitled to a qualified immunity.
With respect to other agents, whose unrefuted affidavits denied
all knowledge of and participation in the alleged specific acts
of misconduct, the trial court construed Mitchell as entitling
defendants to summary judgment if there was no genuine issue
as to their involvement. 20" Nonetheless, because the trial court
did not analyze the summary judgment issue for these defendants
in terms of qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit held that this
issue was not ripe for interlocutory review. In distinguishing
proceedings on immunity issues at the trial and appellate levels,
the Sixth Circuit seems to be suggesting that the right to not
stand trial implicit in the availability of an immunity does not
extend broadly to all defenses. Thus, defendants who claim to
be immune because they did not engage in the alleged acts rather
than because federal law was not clearly established may not be
able to obtain interlocutory review and may have to present
their non-immunity defenses at trial.
Some courts have dealt with similar issues by recognizing a
type of pendent appellate jurisdiction under which federal
appellate courts may decide closely related non-immunity issues.2°2
For example, the Sixth Circuit in Feaster v. Miksch23 decided
an abstention issue in an interlocutory appeal of the denial of
a qualified immunity in order to avoid deciding the immunity
200. 835 F.2d 1153 (6th Cir. 1987).
201. Id. at 1159.
202. See, e.g., Craft v. Wipf, 836 F.2d 412, 418 (8th Cir. 1987); Bolden v.
Alston, 810 F.2d 353 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 229 (1987).
203. 846 F.2d 21 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 148 (1988).
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issue. Nonetheless, the expanded use of pendent appellate
jurisdiction has the potential for broadening the collateral order
doctrine to the point that the exceptions to the final judgment
rule swallow up the rule. 2 4
4. Clearly Established Federal Law
In Robinson v. Bibb2°5 the Sixth Circuit addressed how to
determine whether federal law is clearly established. Robinson
involved a section 1983 suit by the administratrix of the estate
of a fleeing felon who was shot and killed by a police officer.
The shooting took place four days after the Supreme Court
decision in Tennessee v. Garner,2°6 and the defendant claimed
that he was not expected to be aware of the changes in the law
brought about by Garner in this brief period. Thus, he argued
that he fell within the "extraordinary circumstances" exception
identified by the Court in Harlow.2 7 The Sixth Circuit, however,
after suggesting that the defense "might fall within the
exception," 20 8 approached this issue by looking at its earlier
decision in Garner (approximately two years prior to the shooting
in Robinson) in which it limited the use of deadly force by the
police. 20 Thus, the immunity issue in Robinson was whether
decisions of federal courts of appeals could clearly establish the
law and thus deny defendants a qualified immunity.
In addressing this issue, the Sixth Circuit in Robinson held
that "[iun order to be clearly established, a question must be
decided either by the highest state court in the state where the
204. Justice White has criticized the use of "pendent appellate jurisdiction"
to expand the scope of interlocutory appeals by pointing out that under the
"collateral order" exception to the final judgment rule all claims subject to
interlocutory review must fall within the exception. See San Fillippo v. United
States Trust Co., 470 U.S. 1035, 1036 (1985) (White, J., dissenting) ("Any
other rule... would encourage the assertion of frivolous but appealable claims
in order to obtain premature appellate review of otherwise unappealable 'pen-
dent' claims."), denying cert. to 737 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1984).
205. 840 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1988).
206. 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
207. See supra note 193.
208. 840 F.2d at 350.
209. See Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983),
aff'd sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985).
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case arose, by a United States Court of Appeals, or by the
Supreme Court. ' ' 210 Applying that standard, the court held that
the law was clearly established by the Sixth Circuit long before
the fatal shooting.2 1'
Although the conclusion of the Sixth Circuit that the
determination of clearly established law may be made by reference
to decisions other than those of the Supreme Court seems
sound,2 12 the formula adopted by the Sixth Circuit in Robinson
may be too rigid. By requiring the issue to have been decided
by one of the three levels of courts, the Sixth Circuit ignores
the possibility that federal law may become clearly established
in other ways. For example, the focus on the highest state court
ignores the possibility that some state courts of last resort may
only rarely review decisions with which they agree2"3 as well as
the fact that state intermediate appellate court decisions may
sometimes not only create binding statewide precedents but also
place state officials on notice as to what the law requires. 21 4
Moreover, the formula appears to absolutely preclude the
determination from being based on district court decisions. 215
210. 840 F.2d at 351. In taking this position, the Sixth Circuit relied on the
Fourth Circuit decision in Wallace v. King, 626 F.2d 1157, 1161 (4th Cir.
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 969 (1981).
211. 840 F.2d at 351. But cf. Washington v. Starke, 855 F.2d 346, 350 (6th
Cir. 1988) (police officer has a qualified immunity for the use of deadly force
in 1982 to apprehend a burglar even though the use of deadly force may have
violated a police department regulation).
212. Accord Benson v. Allphin, 786 F.2d 268 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 848 (1986); Ward v. San Diego County, 791 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 107 S. Ct. 3263 (1987).
213. Moreover, in Ohio only a limited number of opinions of the Ohio
Court of Appeals are published. See generally Richman & Reynolds, The
Supreme Court Rules for the Reporting of Opinions: A Critique, 46 Omo ST.
L.J. 313 (1985). Thus, given the absence of state court decisions addressing
many of the claims that arise in § 1983 litigation, the Sixth Circuit's insistence
on a decision from the highest state court only pays lip service to the notion
that state courts have a role in establishing federal standards that state and
local officials must follow.
214. See R. MARTni.u, supra note 160, § 1.4, for a discussion of different
roles of state intermediate courts of appeals.
215. Although it might be rare, a series of persuasive district court decisions
should sometimes be sufficient to clearly establish the law and put defendants
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On the other hand, the Robinson formula permits a single
federal appellate court decision to clearly establish federal law.
Where that single decision is in the circuit in which the district
court is located, as in Robinson, the Sixth Circuit's formula
seems appropriate. But when the single appellate court decision
is from another circuit, it should only rarely be sufficient to
clearly establish federal law.
Although the Robinson decision approved reliance on court
of appeals decisions from outside the Sixth Circuit, the court
had earlier rejected such reliance. In Davis v. Holly 216 the Sixth
Circuit refused to permit a single court of appeals opinion from
outside the Sixth Circuit to preclude the application of a qualified
immunity in a case involving the failure of prison officials to
prevent self-injury, noting that "[a] single idiosyncratic opinion
from the court of appeals for another circuit was hardly sufficient
to put the defendants on notice of where this circuit or the
Supreme Court might come out on the issue in question. '217
The Sixth Circuit returned to these issues again in Ohio Civil
Service Employees Association v. Seiter218 in which it held that
prison officials are entitled to a qualified immunity in a suit
challenging strip and body cavity searches of prison employees.
After reviewing the possible sources of clearly established law,
the Sixth Circuit, without citing Robinson but relying on Davis,
explained where courts must look for clearly established law.
Our review of the Supreme Court's decisions and of our own
precedent leads us to conclude that, in the ordinary instance, to
find a clearly established constitutional right, a district court must
find binding precedent by the Supreme Court, its court of appeals
or itself. In an extraordinary case, it may be possible for the
decisions of other courts to clearly establish a principle of law.
For the decisions of other courts to provide such "clearly estab-
on notice. But see Hawkins v. Steingut, 829 F.2d 317, 321 (2d Cir. 1987) ("[A]
district court decision does not 'clearly establish' the law even of its own
circuit, much less that of other circuits.").
216. 835 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1987).
217. Id. at 1182. Accord Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647, 649 (6th Cir.
1988) ("We should focus on whether, at the time defendants acted, the rights
asserted were clearly established by decisions of the Supreme Court or the
courts of this federal circuit").
218. 858 F.2d 1171 (6th Cir. 1988).
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lished law," these decisions must both point unmistakably to the
unconstitutionality of the conduct complained of and be so clearly
foreshadowed by applicable direct authority as to leave no doubt
in the mind of a reasonable officer that his conduct, if challenged
on constitutional grounds, would be found wanting. 21 9
In taking this position, the Seiter court appears to establish
a dichotomy to govern qualified immunity determinations. When
plaintiffs rely on federal appellate court decisions from outside
the Sixth Circuit, such decisions must clearly and unmistakably
establish the unconstitutionality of the conduct. In other cases,
binding circuit court precedents suffice.
In Seiter, however, the Sixth Circuit was unable to find
anything other than a "mere handful of decisions of other
circuit and district courts" 2° prohibiting the complained-of
searches. Thus, in light of the Supreme Court's admonition in
Anderson that courts not operate on too high a level of generality
in addressing immunity issues, 221 the Sixth Circuit held that the
prison officials had a qualified immunity.
5. Unlawful Motive and Qualified Immunities
The Sixth Circuit has also addressed the qualified immunity
issue in cases in which the defendant's alleged unlawful motive
was an essential element of the claim. Although the Supreme
Court has not read a "specific intent ' 222 or other intent
requirement into section 1983, intent (or its equivalent) is an
219. Id. at 1177.
220. Id.
221. 107 S. Ct. at 3038-39.
222. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961). The Sixth Circuit
addressed the issue of "specific intent" in the context of jury instructions in
Donald v. Wilson, 847 F.2d 1191, 1198-99 (6th Cir. 1988), and held that trial
courts in § 1983 actions must instruct the jury that there is no requirement
that the defendant had the "specific intent" to deprive the plaintiff of his
federal rights. Nonetheless, the court held that it was not reversible error to
refuse to give such a requested instruction. But cf. Holt v. Artis, 843 F.2d
242, 244-46 (6th Cir. 1988) (failure to give instruction on lack of specific intent
requirement in a § 1983 case involving the excessive use of force is reversible
error where the court also gave an erroneous instruction treating the qualified
immunity defense as a factual issue for the jury based on subjective factors).
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element of a substantial number of the underlying constitutional
provisions actionable through section 1983.22
In Poe v. Haydon22 the Sixth Circuit noted that the Supreme
Court decision in Harlow adopted an objective rather than a
subjective test for defining the qualified immunity. Nonetheless,
the court noted that "the objective legal reasonableness of the
public employer's conduct will turn, necessarily, on whether that
conduct was motivated by racial, sexual or political animus or
by a legitimate concern for workplace efficiency.''225 Thus, the
Sixth Circuit construed Harlow as still forbidding an inquiry
into whether the defendant actually knew that his conduct was
unlawful but held that "a government official's motive or intent
in carrying out challenged conduct must be considered in the
qualified immunity analysis, where unlawful motive or intent is
a critical element of the substantive claim.' '226 Consequently, the
Sixth Circuit in Poe held that the district court must give the
plaintiff an opportunity to amend her response to a motion for
summary judgment .227
C. Preliminary Reviews of the Merits: Determining Whether
Federal Law is Clearly Established
In the course of deciding interlocutory appeals of section 1983
immunity issues, appellate courts inevitably have the opportunity
to address issues on the merits. In some cases, the Sixth Circuit
has narrowly confined itself to addressing whether the underlying
federal law was clearly established at the time the action accrued.
In other cases, the court has gone beyond that narrow immunity
question to consider whether the alleged conduct violated the
plaintiff's federal rights.
223. See supra note 33.
224. 853 F.2d 418 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 778 (1989).
225. 853 F.2d at 431.
226. Id. See also Balcerzak, supra note 179, at 129 (distinguishing purely
legal questions of qualified immunity from factual inquiries into state of mind
for purposes of substantive claims).
227. Because the Poe case had already proceeded to discovery, the Sixth
Circuit did not have to discuss the implications of its decision on discovery,
but Poe clearly suggests that plaintiffs will be entitled to discovery concerning
the defendants' motivation. See 853 F.2d at 432.
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For example, in Carlson v. Conklin2 the Sixth Circuit
permitted an interlocutory appeal on the qualified immunity
issue by a plaintiff who had been abducted, sexually assaulted,
and robbed by an inmate residing in a half-way house. The
court, however, did not confine the issues on review to the
availability of the qualified immunity but rather held that the
plaintiff failed to state a claim because of the remoteness of the
crime and the act of the defendant in placing the inmate in the
half-way house. Likewise, in Turner v. Scroggy29 the Sixth
Circuit addressed whether an inmate stated a due process claim
against members of a prison adjustment committee that had
disciplined him. Assuming that the defendants were only entitled
to a qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit held that due process
only required that "some evidence" support the decision. Thus,
in the course of reviewing the qualified immunity issue in an
interlocutory appeal, the Sixth Circuit unnecessarily reached the
merits of an issue and removed any basis for the plaintiff and
those similarly situated to obtain injunctive relief based on
similar incidents. Finally, in Walker v. Schaeffer30 the Sixth
Circuit in an interlocutory appeal somehow used the presence
of an immunity defense to decide the appeal on the basis of a
dispositive preclusion issue. After concluding that plaintiffs whose
nolo contendre pleas resulted in guilty findings could not bring
section 1983 false arrest actions, the court held that the defendant
police officers had established a qualified immunity.
On the other hand, in other cases, the Sixth Circuit has
limited the inquiry on interlocutory appeals and not addressed
the state of the current law. For example, in Davis v. Holly23'
the Sixth Circuit narrowly approached the qualified immunity
issue that was the subject of an interlocutory appeal. A patient
at a state mental hospital had sued administrators and supervisors
for failing to prevent her rape by a hospital employee and for
228. 813 F.2d 769 (6th Cir. 1987). See also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416
(6th Cir. 1988) (relying on Carlson to exercise pendent appellate court jurisdic-
tion in an interlocutory appeal and deciding that a municipal court is not a
"person" within the meaning of § 1983).
229. 831 F.2d 135 (6th Cir. 1987).
230. 854 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1988). See also supra notes 116-21 and accom-
panying text.
231. 835 F.2d 1175 (6th Cir. 1987).
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failing to prevent her from injuring herself. The trial court
refused to recognize a qualified immunity on two of the counts,
and defendants brought an interlocutory appeal. The Sixth Circuit
held that the duties of the administrators and supervisors to
provide care and treatment were discretionary in nature and that
the failure to prevent the rape did not violate clearly established
constitutional rights. The court also held that the failure to
prevent self-injury did not violate clearly established constitutional
rights during 1978 and 1979 when the injuries occurred. 232
V. DEADLY FORCE
A. Tennessee v. Garner and Limitations on the Use of
Deadly Force
In Tennessee v. Garner233 the Supreme Court prohibited the
use of deadly force to apprehend nondangerous fleeing felons.
In taking this position, the Court ruled that the fourth amendment
governed not only the necessity of probable cause before making
a seizure but also the method of effectuating the seizure.
Garner involved the use of deadly force to prevent the escape
of an unarmed, fifteen year old burglary suspect. Tennessee
permitted the use of such deadly force in a statute that codified
the common law rule, 234 but the Garner Court, applying a test
232. Other immunity cases that focused on the state of the law at the time
the action accrued in order to decide whether federal rights were clearly
established include: Hensley v. Wilson, 850 F.2d 269 (6th Cir. 1988) (failure
of prison disciplinary committee members to make independent assessment of
informant's reliability not inconsistent with clearly established federal law when
action accrued but reaching merits to adjudicate injunctive claim); Hudson v.
Edmonson, 848 F.2d 682 (6th Cir. 1988) (prison officials would not have
known in 1983 that reasons given for disciplinary action were constitutionally
inadequate); Garvie v. Jackson, 845 F.2d 647 (6th Cir. 1988) (termination of
professor as university department head not inconsistent with clearly established
first and fourteenth amendment rights in 1986); Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d
349 (6th Cir. 1988) (restriction on use of deadly force to apprehend nondan-
gerous fleeing felons clearly established in 1983).
233. 471 U.S. 1 (1985), aff'g 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983).
234. See TENN. CODE Am. § 40-7-108 (1982) ("If, after notice of the
intention to arrest the defendant, he either flees or forcibly resists, the officer
may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.").
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of objective reasonableness, observed that "[i]t is not better that
all felony suspects die than that they escape, ' 235 and limited the
use of deadly force.
In limiting the use of deadly force, the Court affirmed the
Sixth Circuit decision finding the Tennessee statute to be
unconstitutional as applied to the pending case. The Sixth Circuit
had found the Model Penal Code to accurately state the fourth
amendment limitation on the use of deadly force, 236 but the
Model Penal Code is framed in terms of the subjective beliefs
of the person using deadly force .27 The Supreme Court, however,
framed its fourth amendment test in objective not subjective
terms.
Where the officer has probable cause to believe that the suspect
poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or
to others, it is not constitutionally unreasonable to prevent escape
by using deadly force. Thus, if the suspect threatens the officer
with a weapon or there is probable cause to believe that he has
committed a crime involving the infliction or threatened infliction
of serious physical harm, deadly force may be used if necessary
to prevent escape, and if, where feasible, some warning has been
given.28
Garner involved the use of deadly force to apprehend a
nondangerous fleeing felon, but the Sixth Circuit has applied
Garner to cases involving the excessive use of nondeadly force
to effectuate an arrest 239 and most courts have assumed that
235. 471 U.S. at 11.
236. 710 F.2d at 247.
237. See 471 U.S. at 6 n.7 (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.07(2)(b)
(Proposed Official Draft 1962).
238. 471 U.S. at 11-12.
239. See, e.g., McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988); Dugan
v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1987); Leber v. Smith, 773 F.2d 101 (6th
Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1988). The Sixth Circuit has also
permitted plaintiffs to raise claims involving the excessive use of force in an
arrest on substantive due process grounds. See 818 F.2d at 517; Lewis v.
Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1985).
A number of circuits, however, treat the fourth amendment as the exclusive
basis for such claims. See, e.g., Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 710-
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Garner governs not only the amount of force used to apprehend
suspects but also the use of deadly force in self-defense. On
the other hand, the Sixth Circuit has construed the seizure
requirement of the fourth amendment narrowly to find Garner
inapplicable in a number of cases in which police conduct led
to a death.
In Cameron v. City of Pontia& the Sixth Circuit held that
the police pursuit of a fleeing burglary suspect who ran onto a
highway and was killed was not a seizure under the fourth
amendment. In reaching this conclusion, the court construed the
fourth amendment as requiring not only a "completed seizure"'242
12 (7th Cir. 1987); Martin v. Malhoyt, 830 F.2d 237, 261 n. 76 (D.C. Cir.),
reh'g denied, 833 F.2d 1049 (D.C. Cir. 1987). But see Heath v. Henning, 854
F.2d 6, 9 n.2 (2d Cir. 1988) (leaving open the availability of a substantive due
process theory where the use of deadly force was motivated by malice). The
Sixth Circuit has not decided whether the only analysis in excessive force cases
should be under the fourth amendment. See Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d
909, 911 n.2 (6th Cir. 1988). In McDowell, however, the Sixth Circuit acknowl-
edged that it had treated claims of excessive force in the course of an arrest
as both fourth amendment and substantive due process claims but suggested
that the fourth amendment approach was preferable without holding it was
the only approach. 863 F.2d at 1306. But see infra note 260.
240. Garner did not involve a claim of self-defense, but the Court broadly
stated that "[wihenever an officer restrains the freedom of a person to walk
away, he has seized that person," and further noted that "there can be no
question that apprehension by the use of deadly force is a seizure subject to
the reasonableness requirement of the Fourth Amendment." 471 U.S. at 7.
Other circuits have assumed that Garner standards apply to the use of deadly
force in self-defense. See, e.g., Sherrod v. Berry, 856 F.2d 802 (7th Cir. 1988)
(en banc); Gilmere v. City of Atlanta, 774 F.2d 1495 (lth Cir. 1985), cert.
denied, 476 U.S. 1115 & 1124 (1986). The Sixth Circuit, however, requested
supplemental briefing on the applicability of Garner to self-defense claims in
Estate of Daniels v. City of Cleveland, 865 F.2d 1267 (6th CIr. 1989) (unpub-
lished disposition), but did not reach this issue.
241. 813 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1987).
242. Id. at 784. The Sixth Circuit has held that "the reasonableness of a
seizure or method of seizure cannot be challenged under the Fourth Amendment
unless there was a completed seizure (that is, a restraint on the individual's
freedom to leave), accomplished by a means of physical force or show of
authority." Galas v. McKee, 801 F.2d 200, 203 (6th Cir. 1986). The court in
McDowell, however, took an expansive view of the duration of a seizure by
holding that "the seizure that occurs when a person is arrested continues
throughout the time the person remains in the custody of the arresting officers."
863 F.2d at 1306. See also Lester v. City of Chicago, 830 F.2d 706, 713 n.7
(7th Cir. 1987); Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d 1004, 1010 (9th Cir. 1985).
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but also a restraint "by means of physical force or a show of
authority." 2 4 Thus, the court concluded that the decedent's
"freedom of movement was restrained only because he killed
himself by electing to run onto a heavily traveled, high speed
freeway" 2" and did not decide whether the conduct of the police
officers was reasonable. Nonetheless, the court ruled that use
of firearms by the police, which apparently had something to
do with the decedent's "unwise choice of an escape route," 2' 5
was not the proximate cause of the death. 2"
Likewise, in Jones v. Sherri 47 the Sixth Circuit held that an
innocent bystander who was killed as a result of an accident
during a high-speed car chase of a furloughed prisoner could
not challenge the police conduct under the fourth amendment. 2"
243. 813 F.2d at 784 (quoting United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544,
553 (1980)).
244. Id. at 785. In Michigan v. Chesternut, 108 S. Ct. 1975 (1988), however,
the Court explained the reason for looking at the totality of the circumstances
in applying the limitations of the fourth amendment to seizures: "The test is
necessarily imprecise, because it is designed to assess the coercive effect of
police conduct, taken as a whole, rather than to focus on particular details of
that conduct in isolation." Id. at 1979.
245. 813 F.2d at 786 (quoting the district court).
246. The Supreme Court in Brower v. County of Inyo, 109 S. Ct. 1378
(1989), rev'g 817 F.2d 540 (9th Cir. 1987), held that the use of a blind
roadblock that denied a fleeing motorist the option of stopping constituted a
seizure. The Court then remanded for a determination of the reasonableness
of the seizure.
In deciding Brower the Court rejected the Sixth Circuit's narrow definition
of a seizure in Galas, see supra note 243, but observed that Galas did not
involve an unconstitutional seizure because "[v]iolation of the Fourth Amend-
ment requires an intentional acquisition of physical control." Id. at 1381.
Moreover, the Court noted that "the Fourth Amendment addresses 'misuse of
power,' . . . not the accidental effects of otherwise lawful government conduct."
Id. The Brower Court also explicitly approved the result in Cameron, see supra
notes 241-46 and accompanying text, because the decedent in Cameron, unlike
the decedent in Brower, had the opportunity to stop. Id. at 1382-83.
247. 827 F.2d 1102 (6th Cir. 1987).
248. The Sixth Circuit in Jones also rejected the decedent's substantive due
process claim, holding that the accident was too remote a consequence of the
decision to furlough the prisoner. See, e.g., Martinez v. California, 444 U.S.
277 (1980). The court also held that the chase did not rise to the level of gross
negligence or outrageous conduct necessary to state a substantive due process
claim under Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee, 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir.
1987) (en banc). See Jones, 827 F.2d at 1106.
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In Robinette v. Barnesu9 the Sixth Circuit held that the use
of a trained police dog to seize a burglary suspect did not
constitute deadly force, even if the use was unreasonable under
the circumstances. The dog was trained to apprehend a person
by seizing an arm or, if an arm was not available, "the first
thing ... offered to him." 250 The suspect was hiding inside a
darkened building and the dog, apparently finding the arm
unavailable, seized him by the neck thus causing his death.
In rejecting the decedent's fourth amendment claim, the Sixth
Circuit broadly concluded that the use of police dogs does not
constitute deadly force. Although the court acknowledged that
''an instrument of death need not be something as obviously
lethal as a gun or a knife," 251 it identified the following two
factors as relevant to whether the use of a particular law
enforcement tool constitutes deadly force:
the intent of the officer to inflict death or serious bodily harm,
and the probability, known to the officer but regardless of the
officer's intent, that the law enforcement tool, when employed to
facilitate an arrest, creates a "substantial risk of causing death or
serious bodily harm.''252
Thus, the Sixth Circuit accepted the fact that a "seizure" had
taken place under the fourth amendment but then introduced
an intent requirement into the Garner inquiry. 253 The court also
249. 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988).
250. Id. at 911 (quoting trial testimony).
251. Id. at 912.
252. Id. (quoting MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.11(2) (Proposed Official Draft
1962)).
253. Some courts have addressed more directly the issue of whether negligent
conduct can give rise to a fourth amendment claim under Garner. Compare
Dodd v. City of Norwich, 827 F.2d 1, 7-8 (2d Cir. 1987) (on rehearing)
(negligent discharge of cocked firearm during handcuffing of suspect not
actionable under the fourth amendment), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 701 (1988),
with Specht v. Jensen, 832 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir. 1987) (negligence
actionable under the fourth amendment), remanded on other grounds, 853 F.2d
805 (10th Cir. 1988). Although the Supreme Court in Brower read a threshold
intent requirement into the fourth amendment, see supra note 246, it did so
for the purpose of determining whether a detention or taking was willful not
for determining the subjective intent of the police officers who set up the
roadblock.
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decided that, under these circumstances, the use of the police
dog was not unreasonable,2 but the definition of deadly force
in terms of subjective intent removes the fourth amendment as
a protection in those cases in which police dogs or other
nontraditional "law enforcement tools" are used in an objectively
unreasonable way.
Finally, in McDowell v. Rogers255 the Sixth Circuit applied
the fourth amendment to a case involving the excessive use of
force in the course of an arrest but defined the fourth amendment
standard by relying on the subjective "shock the conscience"
test developed by Judge Friendly in Johnson v. Glick.256 Under
this standard, a court must inquire into "whether force was
applied in a good faith effort to maintain or restore discipline
or maliciously and sadistically for the very purpose of causing
harm. ''257
This approach to abuses of governmental authority, especially
in the law enforcement context, may be consistent with both
fourteenth amendment substantive due process 258 and eighth
amendment 2 9 standards but is the antithesis of the objective
approach the Supreme Court has applied in Garner and other
fourth amendment cases.2 m
254. Robinette, 854 F.2d at 913-14.
255. 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988).
256. 481 F.2d 1028 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1033 (1973). See
generally Urbonya, Establishing a Deprivation of a Constitutional Right to
Personal Security Under Section 1983: The Use of Unjustified Force by State
Officials in Violation of the Fourth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, 51
ALB. L. REv. 171 (1987).
257. McDowell, 863 F.2d at 1306-07 (quoting Johnson, 481 F.2d at 1033).
258. Cf. Rochin v. Califorinia, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
259. See Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312 (1986).
260. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 21 (1968) (when fourth amendment
claims are asserted, "it is imperative that the facts be judged against an
objective standard"); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966) (reasona-
bleness of performing blood test when probable cause to believe suspect was
driving while drunk).
In Graham v. Connor, 109 S. Ct. 1865 (1989), rev'g 827 F.2d 945 (4th Cir.
1987), the Supreme Court effectively overruled McDowell and held that claims
that law enforcement officials used excessive force in the course of an arrest,
an investagatory stop, or other seizure are properly analyzed under a fourth
amendment objective reasonableness standard rather than under a subjective
Johnson v. Glick substantive due process standard.
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B. Tennessee v. Garner and the Question of Retroactivity
In addition to narrowly defining the fourth amendment
limitations on the use of deadly force, the Sixth Circuit sitting
en banc in Carter v. City of Chattanooga21 refused by a 9-5
vote to apply retroactively either the 1985 Supreme Court decision
in Tennessee v. Garner262 or the Sixth Circuit's 1983 decision in
Garner.263 Both Carter and Garner involved the use of deadly
force to apprehend fleeing but nondangerous felons in Tennessee,
which permitted the use of deadly force in such cases.3
In the protracted proceedings in Garner, which involved a
1974 shooting, the Sixth Circuit initially held in 1979 that the
individual police officers who killed the decedent were immune
from liability based on their good faith reliance on the Tennessee
statute. 265 The Sixth Circuit, however, remanded for further
proceedings against the city in light of the Supreme Court
decision in Monell v. Department of Social Services,26 holding
that municipalities were proper defendants in section 1983 actions.
The Sixth Circuit had previously rejected a number of
constitutional challenges to the Tennessee fleeing felon statute,
267
261. 850 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795
(1989).
262. 471 U.S. 1 (1985), aff'g sub nom. Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't,
710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983) (hereinafter Garner II). The earlier Sixth Circuit
decision in Garner is reported at 600 F.2d 52 (6th Cir. 1979) (hereinafter
Garner 1).
263. The federal courts of appeals that have expressly addressed the retro-
activity issue are divided. The Second and Eleventh Circuits apply Garner
retroactively, see Davis v. Little, 851 F.2d 605, 609-11 (2d Cir. 1988); Acoff
v. Abston, 762 F.2d 1543, 1548-49 (11th Cir. 1985), but the Tenth Circuit,
relying on Carter, applies Garner prospectively. See Mitchell v. City of Sapula,
857 F.2d 713, 717-20 (10th Cir. 1988) (per curiam).
264. See supra note 234.
265. Garner I, 600 F.2d at 54 ("Applying the qualified 'good faith' privilege
or immunity from liability for constitutional claims .... we affirm that portion
of the . . . judgment dismissing the case against the individual defendants.").
266. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
267. See Wiley v. Memphis Police Dep't, 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977); Beech v. Melancon, 465 F.2d 425 (6th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1114 (1973). See also Cunningham v. Ellington,
323 F. Supp. 1072 (W.D. Tenn. 1971) (three-judge court).
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but those decisions all involved claims against the individual
police officers not their municipal employers.2m
As the Sixth Circuit makes clear in Carter, the Tennessee
fleeing felon statute had been the subject of repeated
constitutional attacks since at least the early 1970's, a campaign
that began to bear fruit in 1979 when the Sixth Circuit in Garner
I distinguished the claim against the police officer, who was
only following state law, from the claim against the city.
In 1983, in Garner H the Sixth Circuit held that it was
unconstitutional to use deadly force to apprehend a fleeing
suspect, 269 although the court applied a subjective rather than
the objective standard the Supreme Court ultimately adopted in
rejecting the use of deadly force to apprehend nondangerous
fleeing felons under the fourth amendment. 270
After the Garner H decision in 1983, of course, there was
little doubt in the Sixth Circuit that the use of deadly force to
apprehend nondangerous fleeing felons was unconstitutional,
and the Sixth Circuit has used 1983 as the date on which federal
law became sufficiently clearly established to justify denying
police officers a qualified immunity in individual capacity suits. 271
Carter, however, involved an improper use of deadly force in
1982, and the issue was whether either the 1985 Supreme Court
decision in Garner or the 1983 Sixth Circuit decision in Garner
H applied retroactively to a section 1983 action on behalf of a
decedent who was killed by Chattanooga police officers while
he was fleeing the scene of a burglary.
268. The Sixth Circuit in Carter referred to the "substantial inconsistency"
between Wiley and the 1979 decision in Garner I, see 850 F.2d at 1127, but
the Sixth Circuit in Garner II had denied any such inconsistency, observing
that the earlier cases did not involve the fourth amendment and further noting
that in each of the earlier cases "the narrow question before the court was
whether the police officer who shot the fleeing boy was entitled to a good
faith privilege against liability based upon his reliance upon the Tennessee
statute." 710 F.2d at 247.
269. 710 F.2d at 243-48.
270. See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text.
271. See Washington v. Starke, 855 F.2d 346 (6th Cir. 1988) (qualified
immunity for use of deadly force in 1982); Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349
(6th Cir. 1988) (no qualified immunity for use of deadly force in 1985). See
also supra notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
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Unlike the statute of limitations cases, which involved remedial
rules designed to cut off litigation,272 Carter involved a substantive
rule of constitutional law, but the Sixth Circuit refused to apply
either Garner decision retroactively, thus immunizing the
municipality from liability for any unconstitutional killings that
occurred prior to 1983 and denying the plaintiff all relief.
In addressing this issue, the Sixth Circuit applied Chevron Oil
Co. v. Huson 273 in which the Supreme Court adopted a three-
part test to determine whether courts should depart from the
general rule requiring the application of current law to pending
cases. Chevron establishes a presumption in favor of the
retroactive application of new decisions but permits courts to
apply decisions prospectively in limited circumstances.
The Chevron criteria relied on by the Sixth Circuit in Carter
was defined by the Supreme Court as follows:
In our cases dealing with the nonretroactivity question, we have
generally considered three separate factors. First, the decision to
be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law,
either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may
have relied . . ., or by deciding an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed .... Second, it has been
stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each
case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its
purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will fur-
ther or retard its operation." . . . Finally, we have weighed the
inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a deci-
sion of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if
applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding
the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity. "274
The most important of the Chevron criteria involves whether
the decision to be applied nonretroactively establishes "a new
principle of law, either by overturning clear past precedent on
which litigants may have relied .... or by deciding an issue of
272. See supra notes 62-78 and accompanying text.
273. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
274. Id. at 106-07 (citations omitted).
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first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed .... ",275
In applying Chevron, the Sixth Circuit in Carter noted that
until its 1983 Garner I decision "no court had struck down the
fleeing felon rule as unconstitutional ... under the Fourth
amendment. ' 276 Thus, the Carter court concluded that Garner
II, as affirmed by the Supreme Court, established "a new and
unexpected principle of law by setting aside clearly established
precedent . . . on which the City of Chattanooga and its police
officers had a right to rely . . . in 1982. ' ' 277 Alternatively, the
court found that the Supreme Court in Garner decided "an
issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly
foreshadowed.' '278
In reaching this conclusion, the Sixth Circuit treated the
Supreme Court decision in Garner as establishing a new principle
of law by setting aside clearly established precedent particularly
in the circuit. The Supreme Court decision in Garner, however,
did not overrule any past precedents interpreting federal law.
Rather, Garner was a logical (though possibly unexpected) result
of a progression of Supreme Court decisions that had interpreted
the fourth amendment not only to require probable cause but
also to regulate the manner in which both searches and seizures
are conducted. 279
Because the Supreme Court in Garner did not overrule any
of its own precedents, 280 the "clear past precedent" the Sixth
275. Id. at 106.
276. 850 F.2d at 1123.
277. Id. at 1129.
278. Id.
279. See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 9-11 (1985). See also Bivens v.
Six Unknown Named Agents, 403 U.S. 388 (1971) (Burger C.J., dissenting).
I wonder what would be the judicial response to a police order authorizing
"shoot to kill" with respect to every fugitive. It is easy to predict our
collective wrath and outrage. We, in common with all rational minds,
would say that the police response must relate to the gravity and need;
that a "shoot" order might conceivably be tolerable to prevent the escape
of a convicted killer but surely not for a car thief, a pickpocket or a
shoplifter.
Id. at 419.
280. Judge Merritt, dissenting in Carter, pointed out that the Supreme Court
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Circuit concluded had been overruled could only have been the
Sixth Circuit's decisions in Wiley v. Memphis Police Department21
and the other pre-Garner I cases. 28 2 These decisions, however,
were clearly not overruled despite the attempt by the Carter
court to treat them as deciding more than the qualified immunity
issues necessary to absolve individual police officers from liability
for the use of deadly force. 283
The Sixth Circuit in Carter also concluded that the Supreme
Court in Garner decided "an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed." What is puzzling
about the court's reliance on this alternative formulation of the
first prong of Chevron, however, is that it proves too much.
Virtually all Supreme Court decisions are issues of first impression
in the sense that the Court has generally not previously addressed
the precise issue. Moreover, given the number of closely divided
decisions by the Supreme Court, few results are clearly
foreshadowed. Thus, if this formulation of Chevron is construed
literally, as the Sixth Circuit did in Carter, only rarely would
decisions fail to meet this prong of Chevron and the presumption
in favor of retroactive decisions would be undercut.
The Carter court erred in treating Garner as an issue of first
impression. 28 4 The Supreme Court had previously held that the
had not previously spoken on the use of the fourth amendment to limit the
use of deadly force. Thus, Judge Merritt concluded that no past precedents
stood in the way of the holding that the fleeing felon statute violated the
fourth amendment. 850 F.2d at 1139 (Merritt, J., dissenting).
281. 548 F.2d 1247 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 822 (1977).
282. See supra note 267.
283. See supra notes 265-68 and accompanying text.
284. In permitting the decision of "an issue of first impression whose
resolution was not clearly foreshadowed" to weigh in favor of prospectivity,
see Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106 (1971), the Supreme Court
in Chevron relied on Allen v. State Bd. of Elections, 393 U.S. 544, 572 (1969),
in which the Court reviewed a provision of the recently enacted Voting Rights
Act of 1965 that had not previously been the subject of any judicial construc-
tions by appellate courts. The Allen Court refused to apply its new construction
of the Act to even the pending case to require a new election because certain
changes in voting qualifications had not been submitted to the Attorney General.
In addressing whether to apply the Court's decision in Wilson v. Garcia,
471 U.S. 261 (1985), retroactively, the Eighth Circuit discussed when a case
decides an "issue of first impression." See Wycoff v. Menke, 773 F.2d 983,
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fourth amendment governs the means used to effect a seizure 5
and the Sixth Circuit had reviewed a number of cases challenging
the use of deadly force based on the Tennessee statute. 286 Thus,
neither court in Garner was writing on a blank slate, and the
Sixth Circuit's construction of this part of the first Chevron
criterion places an impossible burden on parties urging the
retroactive application of new decisions .87
The principal problem with Carter is that it attempts to parse
the nonretroactivity language from the first prong of Chevron
as though it were construing a statute and, in so doing, loses
sight of what Chevron and the Supreme Court's retroactivity
cases are really about.
The Court asks whether there was "a new principle of law"
or a "clear break" to determine whether a party was justified
in relying on the prior law. Thus, in the context of statutes of
limitations the Court has upheld the retroactive application of
a shorter limitations period because a plaintiff could not
justifiably rely on the uncertainty and expect to preserve his
action.
281
In the area of the improper use of deadly force, however, the
threshold inquiry under Chevron should be whether city officials
in Chatanooga were justified in adhering to their deadly force
policy after the Sixth Circuit in 1979 signaled in another Tennessee
case that the issue was open, and other courts had begun to
reject such policies on constitutional grounds.
986 (8th Cir. 1985) ("The issue presented to the Supreme Court in Wilson had
not previously been addressed by that Court. The issue had, however, been
addressed in virtually every circuit . .. and thus cannot realistically be consid-
ered one of 'first impression."') (citations omitted), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1028
(1986).
285. See Garner, 471 U.S. at 7-8, and cases cited.
286. See supra notes 262 & 267.
287. Ironically, as Judge Merritt also pointed out in Carter, 850 F.2d at
1140, the Sixth Circuit (or at least its predecessor) had expressed doubts more
than one hundred years ago about the validity of a rule allowing deadly force
against all fleeing felony suspects. See United States v. Clark, 31 F. 710, 713
(C.C.E.D. Mich. 1887) ("Suppose, for example, a person were arrested for
petit larceny, which is a felony at the common law, might an officer under
any circumstances be justified in killing him? I think not. The punishment is
altogether too disproportionate to the magnitude of the offense.").
288. See Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656 (1987).
[Vol.20
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 560 1988-1989
SECTION 1983
The Sixth Circuit in Carter also looks too closely at the
doctrinal bases of challenges to the use of deadly force to
apprehend nondangerous fleeing felons. Although the Sixth
Circuit may be correct in noting that prior to 1983 no court
had rejected such a policy on fourth amendment grounds,u 9 that
is not the point. The fact that the unconstitutionality of the
policy was not clearly established prior to 1983 is relevant to
the qualified immunity but not the retroactivity issue.
The Sixth Circuit gives lip service to these principles when it
quotes at length from United States v. Johnson290 in which the
Supreme Court defined more precisely when a new principle of
law replaces prior law.
In general, the Court has not subsequently read a decision to
work a "sharp break in the web of the law," . . . unless that
ruling caused "such an abrupt and fundamental shift in doctrine
as to constitute an entirely new rule which in effect replaced an
older one. . . ." Such a break has been recognized only when a
decision explicitly overrules a past precedent of this Court, ...
disapproves a practice this Court arguably has sanctioned in prior
cases, ... or overturns a longstanding and widespread practice
to which this Court has not spoken, but which a near-unanimous
body of lower court authority has expressly approved. 291
Nonetheless, it is apparent that the Sixth Circuit in Carter did
not apply these principles but instead concluded that Garner II
represented a new principle of law because the court had not
previously rejected the use of deadly force to apprehend
nondangerous fleeing felons.
The Second Circuit has taken a contrary view of Garner in
applying it retroactively to an improper use of deadly force in
1981. In Davis v. Little292 the Second Circuit pointed out "that
no real issue of retroactivity arises 'when a decision ... merely
... applie[s] settled precedents to new and different factual
289. 850 F.2d at 1123.
290. 457 U.S. 537 (1982).
291. Id. at 551 (citations omitted).
292. 851 F.2d 605 (2d Cir. 1988).
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situations.' ' 29 Thus, Davis views Garner as not "announcing a
new rule" but rather "apply[ing] a traditional Fourth Amendment
balancing test to a particular set of facts." ' 294 Moreover, the
Second Circuit has noted that the substantive due process "shock
the conscience" test also limited the improper use of deadly
force and that "the similarities between this test and the Fourth
Amendment balancing test set forth in Garner far outweigh any
differences." 295
Carter also raises an important issue concerning the nature of
the reliance that justifies denying new decisions retroactive effect.
The Sixth Circuit seems to ignore the fact that the case only
involved municipal liability. Carter did not deal with the qualified
immunity of individual officials who may not be liable for
damages under section 1983 unless their conduct violated clearly
established federal law. Under Carter, however, the 1983 decision
by the Sixth Circuit in Garner II is the bright line for both the
qualified immunity29 and the retroactivity inquiries. These issues,
however, involve different policies and it is a mistake to not
distinguish them.
In its qualified immunity cases, the Supreme Court has
immunized officials sued under section 1983 in their individual
capacity unless they violated clearly established federal law. In
applying this test, the Court has required an objective test to
avoid subjective inquiries into the motives or state of mind of
defendants. The Court thus assumes that reasonably well trained
public officials are aware of the applicable federal law. In effect,
the Court treats it as unfair to make individual public officials
liable for damages for failing to predict future developments in
the law. Moreover, the immunity is a protection not only from
liability but also from standing trial to protect individuals who
accept public positions from the burden of trials at which they
could be found liable. 29 Thus, an official sued in an individual
293. Id. at 609 (quoting United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. at 549).
294. Id. at 609.
295. Id. at 610.
296. See Robinson v. Bibb, 840 F.2d 349 (6th Cir. 1988). See also supra
notes 205-11 and accompanying text.
297. See generally Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982). See also supra
note 164.
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capacity section 1983 damage suit may have a qualified immunity
in a case in which a new principle of law applies retroactively.
On the other hand, municipalities do not have a qualified
immunity in section 1983 cases 298 and may be liable for their
official policies even if the federal law on which a suit is based
was not clearly established when the action accrued. Moreover,
the presumption of retroactive application applies, and this is
consistent with the Court's effort to balance the competing
interests of individual wrongdoers, municipalities and victims of
illegal governmental actions. 299
Finally, one of the questions suggested by Carter is what
effect, if any, will the decision have on cases challenging the
use of nondeadly force under the fourth amendment. Although
Garner involved the use of deadly force, the objective test it
adopted under the fourth amendment to govern the means used
to effect seizures applies to nondeadly but excessive force. Thus,
in Dugan v. Brooks30 the Sixth Circuit relied on Garner in a
case involving the alleged excessive use of force by a university
police officer, noting that "even if there is probable cause for
the arrest, the fourth amendment further requires that the means
used to effect the arrest be reasonable, which is determined by
balancing the extent of the intrusion against the need for it."301
The incident in Dugan, however, took place in 1981, before
both the Supreme Court's 1985 decision in Garner and the Sixth
Circuit's 1983 decision in Garner II. The question then is whether
the non-retroactive application of Garner in Carter applies to
fourth amendment claims involving the use of nondeadly but
excessive force. 02
298. Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980).
299. Id. at 657. See generally P. SCHUCK, SUINr GovEmrumr (1983).
300. 818 F.2d 513, 516 (6th Cir. 1987).
301. Id. at 516.
302. Even if the Garner decisions are only applied prospectively, pre-1983
uses of excessive force may still be actionable as substantive due process
violations. Cf. Dugan, 818 F.2d at 517 (applying substantive due process
analysis to a 1981 incident). Moreover, what is unique about Garner is that
after applying a fourth amendment balancing test, the Supreme Court effectively
adopted a per se rule under which it is never reasonable to use deadly force
to apprehend nondangerous fleeing felons. Independent of this ruling, the
fourth amendment places other limitations on the means by which seizures are
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VI. DAMAGES
The Supreme Court has relied on evolving principles of
compensation to determine the damages available in section 1983
litigation. 3 Under this approach, courts develop a uniform
national law of section 1983 damages by considering the nature
of the legal violation and the injury to the plaintiff. °4
In Carey v. Piphus3 05 the Court refused to award damages
for procedural due process violations without proof of actual
damages. Carey, however, did not reach whether presumed
damages would be available for violations of federal law that
were not procedural in nature. However, in Memphis Community
School District v. Stachura0 6 the Court held that damages are
not available under section 1983 for violations of constitutional
rights based on speculation about the importance of the rights
in our system of government or their role in American history.
Although the Stachura Court prohibited the use of presumed
damages to supplement awards of compensatory damages, the
Court acknowledged that there might be circumstances in which
"a plaintiff seeks compensation for an injury that is likely to
have occurred but difficult to establish'' 7 and left open the
possibility of awards of presumed damages in lieu of actual
damages in such cases.
In Ratliff v. Wellington Exempted Village School Board of
Education'8 the Sixth Circuit vacated an award of damages
given under a jury instruction that permitted the jury to consider
the abstract value of the first amendment rights of a school
principal who challenged her discharge. The trial was held prior
made. See supra note 239. Thus, even under Carter the Sixth Circuit could
apply the Garner decisions retroactively to cases involving the excessive use of
nondeadly force. See, e.g., McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988)
(post-Carter case applying Garner and the fourth amendment to a 1981 non-
deadly force claim without citing Carter or discussing the retroactivity issue).
303. See generally Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30 (1983); City of Newport v.
Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981); Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
304. Carey, 435 U.S. at 255.
305. 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
306. 477 U.S. 299 (1986).
307. Id. at 310-11.
308. 820 F.2d 792 (6th Cir. 1987).
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to the Stachura decision, and the defendant did not object to
the a jury instruction. The Sixth Circuit, however, permitted
the defendant to raise for the first time on appeal the challenge
to jury instructions that the court described as arguably correct
when given but clearly incorrect under Stachura.a°9 The Ratliff
court then applied Stachura retroactively to vacate the damage
award. In taking this position, the court relied on a since-
discredited line of Sixth Circuit cases that applied new decisions
retroactively whenever they had been so applied by the appellate
court that rendered them.310
Alternatively, the Sixth Circuit in Ratliff relied on Chevron
Oil Co. v. Huson3" to apply its ruling retroactively. In taking
this position, however, the Sixth Circuit did not analyze the
Chevron factors 12 but merely assumed that they required
retroactive application of Stachura. This conclusion, however,
is curious in light of the court's decision to permit the Ratliff
defendant to appeal the jury instruction because it was arguably
correct when given. Thus, the Ratliff opinion itself suggests that
Stachura adopted a new principle of law, especially in the Sixth
Circuit from which the Stachura decision came.
The Sixth Circuit has also had an opportunity to apply the
Stachura exception to the prohibition of presumed damages. In
Waije v. City of Winchester, Kentucky313 the Sixth Circuit upheld
a $5,000 compensatory damage award to a city firefighter who
was suspended in violation of his first amendment rights. In an
earlier appeal, the Sixth Circuit had held that more than nominal
damages were appropriate, 3 4 and the district court awarded
$5,000 in damages for a violation of substantive constitutional
rights. On appeal, the Waije defendants argued that Stachura
prohibited awards of damages based on the abstract value of
constitutional rights. In upholding the damage award, the Sixth
309. Id. at 797.
310. Id. See Smith v. General Motors Corp., 747 F.2d 372, 375 (6th Cir.
1984) (en banc). The Sixth Circuit subsequently repudiated the Smith line of
cases. See supra notes 73-78 and accompanying text.
311. 404 U.S. 97 (1971).
312. See supra text accompanying note 274.
313. 827 F.2d 10 (6th Cir. 1987).
314. See 773 F.2d 729 (6th Cir. 1985).
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Circuit relied on the language in Stachura approving the use of
presumed damages in cases where the "plaintiff seeks
compensation for an injury that is likely to have occurred but
difficult to establish. '315
The Sixth Circuit has also decided a number of cases involving
the application of federal damage principles to section 1983
litigation. In Conklin v. Lovely316 the court limited the ability
of the defendants to question the plaintiff in a public employment
discharge case about unemployment insurance benefits. In
upholding this limitation on the scope of cross-examination, the
court noted that under mitigation of damages principles
unemployment insurance benefits are generally not deducted
from back pay awards in unlawful discharge cases.
In Young v. Langley,3 7 an unpublished decision, the Sixth
Circuit addressed the availability of prejudgment interest in
section 1983 actions and applied the general rule in which
prejudgment interest is available in federal question cases.
Nonetheless, the court refused to disturb the trial court's exercise
of discretion in refusing to award prejudgment interest in this
politically-motivated demotion case in which the plaintiff was
awarded $750,000 in compensatory and punitive damages. 318
VII. MUNiCiPAL LIABmITY
The Sixth Circuit did not announce any important new
principles involving municipal liability during the period under
review. Nonetheless, an unpublished 1986 Sixth Circuit decision
was the vehicle for what had become the Supreme Court's annual
attempt to sort out the many complexities surrounding the scope
315. 827 F.2d at 12. Accord Parrish v. Johnson, 800 F.2d 600, 610-11 (6th
Cir. 1986) (following Stachura to reject an "actual injury" requirement in
eighth amendment damage actions and approving presumed general damages
for a prison guard's waiving a knife in front of a prisoner).
316. 834 F.2d 543 (6th Cir. 1987).
317. 840 F.2d 19 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 243 (1988).
318. See Young v. Langley, 793 F.2d 792 (6th Cir.) (table) (upholding damage
award on merits), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 950 (1986).
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of municipal liability under section 1983.319 In City of Canton
v. Harris32" the Supreme Court held that in limited circumstances
municipal policies that are not themselves unconstitutional may
be the basis for imposing liability under section 1983. In reaching
this conclusion, however, the Court held that an inadequate
training policy may only serve as the basis for municipal liability
where the failure to train amounts to a deliberate indifference
to constitutional rights and is the actual cause of the ultimate
injury. 321
Prior to Harris, the plurality opinion in City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle322 by Justice Rehnquist suggested that conduct
that was not itself unconstitutional could not be the basis of
municipal liability under section 1983.323 The Court granted
certiorari in City of Springfield v. Kibbe-4 to resolve this issue
but dismissed the writ as improvidently granted because of the
defendant's failure to object to the jury instructions. Nonetheless,
the four Justices who would have reached the merits of this
issue in Kibbe-Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist,
White and O'Connor-spoke approvingly of the imposition of
municipal liability based on improper training policies that caused
the constitutional deprivation.3 25
319. For earlier attempts, see generally City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108
S. Ct. 915 (1988); City of Springfield v. Kibbe, 480 U.S. 257 (1987), dismissing
cert. as improvidently granted 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985); Pembaur v. City
of Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469 (1986); City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S.
808 (1985).
320. 109 S. Ct. 1197 (1989), vacating sub nom. Harris v. Cmich, 798 F.2d
1414 (6th Cir. 1986) (unpublished disposition). The Sixth Circuit opinion is
available on WESTLAW. See 1986 WL17268.
321. Id. at 1204-06.
322. 471 U.S. 808 (1985).
323. Id. at 824 n.7.
324. 480 U.S. 257 (1987), dismissing cert. as improvidently granted 777 F.2d
801 (1st Cir. 1985).
325. 480 U.S. at 260 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The Court did not discuss
this issue in City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 108 S. Ct. 915 (1988), but Justice
Brennan, in his concurring opinion, observed that the issue of "whether a city
can be subjected to liability for a policy that, while not unconstitutional in
and of itself, may give rise to constitutional deprivations" was still open. Id.
at 936.
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The Sixth Circuit, however, had long taken the position that
a training policy that is not itself unconstitutional may be the
basis for establishing municipal liability under section 1983. This
position was reaffirmed in Rymer v. Davis26 in which the court
upheld the imposition of liability on a municipality for failing
to train police officers in proper arrest procedures. In Rymer,
the court made clear that grossly negligent training policies that
caused unconstitutional conduct could be the basis for municipal
liability without running afoul of the Supreme Court's rejection
in Monell v. Department of Social Services327 of respondeat
superior by upholding the following jury instruction:
If you find for the plaintiff with regard to his claim of excessive
force, then you will consider the claim made by him against the
City of Shepherdsville; and if you find from the preponderance
of the evidence that the City of Shepherdsville trained its police
officers in a way that was so reckless or grossly negligent that
future police misconduct was almost inevitable or would be prop-
erly characterized as substantially certain to result, then you shall
find for the plaintiff against the City of Shepherdsville.
a2 1
Thus, the Sixth Circuit had approved the imposition of municipal
liability in section 1983 actions when plaintiffs could establish
the link between grossly negligent training policies and resulting
constitutional deprivations.329
326. 754 F.2d 198 (6th Cir.), vacated and remanded sub nom. City of
Shepherdsville v. Rymer, 473 U.S. 901, adhered to on remand, 775 F.2d 756
(6th Cir. 1985) (on remand), cert. denied, 480 U.S. 916 (1987).
327. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
328. 775 F.2d at 757.
329. To establish municipal liability under § 1983, the Sixth Circuit requires
a plaintiff to produce evidence establishing that a constitutional violation was
the inevitable result of the municipal policy. See Frost v. Hawkins County Bd.
of Educ., 851 F.2d 822, 827 (6th Cir.) (failure to demonstrate that arrest
growing out of a dispute over the choice of school textbooks was proximately
caused by custom or policy of city or school board), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct.
529 (1988); Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194, 200 (6th
Cir. 1987) (failure to produce evidence that removal of child from custody
without due process was the inevitable result of inadequate training and
supervision of probation officer). See also Foster v. Walsh, 864 F.2d 416 (6th
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The Supreme Court decision in Harris clearly rejects reliance
on grossly negligent training policies as the basis for municipal
liability.330 Harris involved a jury verdict against a city for the
denial of medical care to an arrestee. The plaintiff had offered
evidence describing the failure of jail officials to provide medical
care for the gross stress reaction she experienced after her arrest
on a driving violation. She also introduced evidence that the
city gave shift commanders broad authority to decide what
medical care was appropriate for prisoners based on personal
observations but provided no training or other instructions (other
than minimal first aid instruction) to prepare them for making
such determinations. The Sixth Circuit ultimately vacated the
award of damages because of a faulty instruction concerning
supervisory liability, but the issues before the Supreme Court
were whether and when the inadequate training of jail personnel
could be the basis for municipal liability.
The Supreme Court in Harris held that municipal liability
may be based on a city's training policy only where the failure
to train amounts to a deliberate indifference to the rights of
persons with whom city employees come into contact. In making
the inquiry, the Court required lower courts to look to the
duties assigned specific employees and to the experience of the
city in a particular area. Thus, the Court observed that the need
to train police officers in the proper use of deadly force was
" 'so obvious,' that failure to do so could properly be
characterized as 'deliberate indifference' to constitutional
rights." 33' Moreover, the Court noted that frequent violations
of constitutional rights could make "the need for further training
... plainly obvious to the city policy makers. 33 2 In reaching
these conclusions, however, the Court distinguished the
requirements for municipal liability from the underlying definition
of the constitutional violation33 3 and accepted inadequate training
Cir. 1988) (rejecting § 1983 liability of a municipal court based on respondeat
superior absent an allegation that the municipal court had a policy or custom
of issuing warrants for the arrest of traffic violators who had already paid
their fines).
330. 109 S. Ct. at 1204-05 (1989).
331. 109 S. Ct. at 1205 n.10.
332. Id.
333. Id. at 1205 n.8.
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as a basis for imposing section 1983 liability without requiring
a showing that city policy makers acted unconstitutionally.
Although the Sixth Circuit decision in Harris was consistent
with earlier Sixth Circuit cases that found municipal liability
under section 1983 when grossly negligent training leads to
constitutional violations, the Sixth Circuit has not always
separated the alleged constitutional violation from the defective
training policy. For example, in Molton v. City of Cleveland33 4
the Sixth Circuit reversed a section 1983 damage award in a
case brought against a city by the estate of a pretrial detainee
who committed suicide. The plaintiff had identified a number
of defects in the structure and operation of the jail that persisted
despite eight prior suicides. The plaintiff contended that this
constituted deliberate indifference to the strong likelihood that
the decedent would take his own life, but the Sixth Circuit
concluded that the plaintiff "never adduced evidence of a
definitive City policy, custom, or usage which was an affirmative
link, the moving force that animated the behavior-the acts of
commission or omission-of the police officers that resulted in
the constitutional violations alleged. ' 335 Moreover, the Sixth
Circuit found that the policies identified by the estate described
merely negligent acts that could not be the basis for municipal
liability under section 1983.336
In taking this position, the Sixth Circuit read Supreme Court
precedents as "requir[ing] proof of a deliberate and discernible
city policy to maintain an inadequately trained police department,
or nonsuicide-proof, inadequately designed and equipped jails." 337
334. 839 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1345 (1989).
335. Id. at 246.
336. After concluding that the training policies constituted negligence, the
Sixth Circuit liberally construed Ohio law to impose municipal liability on the
city for negligently maintaining a jail. See 839 F.2d at 247-48. This result was
possible because the cause of action in Molton arose after the abrogation of
governmental immunity by the Ohio Supreme Court, but before the November
20, 1985, effective date of the Ohio Political Subdivision Liability Act, Chapter
2744 of the Ohio Revised Code, which immunized political subdivisions and
their employers from liability for various discretionary activities involving policy
making, planning or enforcement. See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2744.03(A)(3)
(Anderson Supp. 1987).
337. 839 F.2d at 246 (relying on Tuttle and Pembaur). See also Beddingfield
v. City of Pulaski, Tenn., 861 F.2d 968 (6th Cir. 1988) (relying on Molton to
reverse the denial of city's motion for judgment n.o.v. in a jail suicide case).
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Such a standard, however, requires far more deliberateness than
either the Rymer instruction or the Supreme Court decision in
Harris contemplates and places the almost impossible burden
on plaintiffs of demonstrating that municipal policymakers
engaged in deliberate wrongdoing.
The Sixth Circuit in Molton also appears to have ignored the
narrow scope of review of jury verdicts under the seventh
amendment. There is no discussion at all of the jury instructions
and no apparent deference to jury factfinding. Thus, the Sixth
Circuit did not ask whether the jury instructions were correct
or whether the verdict rested on substantial evidence. Rather,
the court reviewed the evidence de novo and, in effect, concluded
that the evidence could not as a matter of law establish the
degree of fault necessary to establish municipal liability under
section 1983.338
VIII. WAIVERS
The most novel Sixth Circuit section 1983 decision during the
period was Leaman v. Ohio Department of Mental Retardation
& Development Disabilities,339 which involved an action by a
probationary state employee challenging her termination on
federal statutory and constitutional grounds and seeking both
damages and equitable relief.
Prior to commencing her section 1983 action in federal court,
the plaintiff had filed a virtually identical complaint against the
state agency in the Ohio Court of Claims, which dismissed her
suit on the merits. The plaintiff did not appeal this decision but
rather elected to pursue her federal court section 1983 claim
against the state officials.34 The Ohio Court of Claims Act
includes a provision under which "filing a civil action in the
court of claims results in a complete waiver of any cause of
338. For a discussion of the tendency of appellate courts to invade the
province of the jury in reviewing § 1983 cases involving municipal liability, see
Schnapper, Municipal Liability: From Monell to Tuttle and Pembaur 44-45, in
2 Cir RIGHTs LrIGATION AND ATrORNEY sFS ANNuAL HANDBOOK (J. Lobel
ed. 1986).
339. 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2844
(1988).
340. Id. at 951.
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action, based on the same act or omission, which the filing
party has against any state officer or employee." '3 41 Thus, Ohio
has waived sovereign immunity from suit in its own courts, but
as a condition of bringing such suits plaintiffs must refrain from
suing the individual employees involved.3 42
The issues in Leaman were whether the state waiver provision
applied to section 1983 actions, and, if so, whether it was
consistent with federal law. The trial court applied the waiver
to section 1983 actions and dismissed the action. The original
Sixth Circuit panel reversed in a split decision, but the full
Circuit voted to rehear the case en banc. 343 The court then
341. Ogxo REV. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
342. This waiver, however, does not apply where the court of claims "de-
termines that the act or omission was manifestly outside the scope of the
officer's or employee's office or employment or that the officer or employee
acted with malicious purpose, in bad faith, or in a wanton or reckless manner."
Onio REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(A)(1) (Anderson Supp. 1987). See also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 9.86 (Anderson 1984) (defining immunity of state officers
and employees similarly).
Most states with courts of claims do not have waiver provisions but rather
provide courts of claims with exclusive jurisdiction over certain cases. For
example, the Michigan Court of Claims Act provides that the jurisdiction
conferred against the state be exclusive, see MIcH. Corn. LAWS § 600.6419
(1987), and that "[n]o claimant may be permitted to file [a] claim ... who
has an adequate remedy . . . in the federal courts.... " MicH. Comp. LAWS
§ 600.6440 (1987). In New York, state courts of general jurisdiction do not
have jurisdiction over damage actions against state correctional officials, see
N.Y. CORRECT. LAW § 24(1) (McKinney 1987), but suits seeking damages for
the illegal activities of state correctional officials may be brought against the
state in the New York Court of Claims. See Cepeda v. Coughlin, 128 A.2d
995, 513 N.Y.S.2d 528 (App. Div.), appeal denied, 70 N.Y.2d 602, 518 N.Y.S.2d
1024, 512 N.E.2d 550 (1987). Finally, the Illinois Court of Claims has exclusive
jurisdiction over all claims against the state "founded upon any law of the
State." ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 37, § 439.8(a) (1983 & Supp. 1988). See also infra
note 344 (discussing Tennessee Claims Commission).
343. 825 F.2d at 948. The circumstances of granting the rehearing en banc
raised another unusual issue. The Sixth Circuit initially voted to rehear the
case en banc by a vote of 8-7, as authorized by 28 U.S.C. § 46(c). One of the
judges who voted for the rehearing en banc, Alan E. Norris, was the Republican
Majority Leader of the Ohio House of Representatives at the time the Ohio
Court of Claims Act was passed in 1975 and had drafted and sponsored the
legislation. See 825 F.2d at 965. After oral argument, however, Judge Norris
recused himself from further participation. See id. at 948. Had Judge Norris
not participated in the vote to rehear, the motion for rehearing would have
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affirmed the district court decision by an 8-6 vote and held that
by bringing an action against the state agency in the Court of
Claims, the plaintiff waived her right to pursue her section 1983
claim against the individual employees. 3"
Before reaching the federal issue, the Sixth Circuit had to
decide the threshold state law issue of whether the "complete
waiver of any cause of action" applied to section 1983 cases.
Reading these phrases broadly and literally, the court concluded
that the phrase was unambiguous and included section 1983
claims in federal courts. 345
Turning to the federal question, the Sixth Circuit distinguished
Rosa v. CantreiP" in which the Tenth Circuit held that the
failed by a 7-7 vote of the Circuit's active judges. See id. at 966. Thus, the
issue was whether the subsequent recusal applied retroactively to require the
vacating of the en banc reconsideration, but the Chief Judge ruled at an
administrative meeting that the recusal was not retroactive, see id. at 948, and
the full court supported that position over written dissents by Judges Merritt
and Jones. See id. at 960 & 969.
344. The Sixth Circuit took Leaman a step further in White v. Gerbitz, 860
F.2d 661 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1160 (1989), which involved
a proceeding before the Tennessee Claims Commission, an administrative body
that receives claims against the state. Under Tennessee law, the filing of a
claim with the commission "operate(s) as a waiver of any cause of action,
based on the same act or omission, which the claimant has against any state
officer or employee [for acts or omissions) .. . within the scope of the officer's
or employee's office or employment." TENN. CODE ANNm. § 9-8-307(b) (Supp.
1986). Concluding that administrative proceedings before the Commission were
"the functional equivalent of the proceeding before the Ohio Court of Claims
in Leaman," see 860 F.2d at 664, the Sixth Circuit in White dismissed a §
1983 claim brought by a plaintiff who had filed a similar claim with the
Tennessee Claims Commission.
345. 825 F.2d at 952-53. Some state courts, however, apply different rules
of statutory construction in deciding whether state policies apply to § 1983
actions. For example, in Mellinger v. Town of West Springfield, 401 Mass.
188, 196, 515 N.E.2d 584, 589 (1987), the Supreme Judicial Court of Massa-
chusetts adopted a "clear statement rule" of statutory construction under which
it refused to apply a state notice of claim requirement to § 1983 actions "absent
a clear legislative statement that § 1983 claimants must comply" with the state
policy. On the other hand, the Wisconsin Supreme Court in Felder v. Casey,
139 Wis.2d 614, 408 N.W.2d 19 (1987), rev'd on other grounds, 108 S. Ct.
2302 (1988), applied its state notice of claim requirement to § 1983 actions
because the state statute broadly provided that "no action may be brought"
unless the plaintiff complied with the statute. Id. at 624, 408 N.W.2d at 24.
346. 705 F.2d 1208 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 821 (1983).
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exclusive remedy provision of a state worker's compensation act
did not bar suits against municipal employers under section
1983. Unlike Rosa, in which the state statute barred all section
1983 actions, the Ohio statute gave plaintiffs the option of either
bringing a section 1983 action against individual employees or
pursuing a remedy against the state in the Ohio Court of Claims.
Analogizing this to an "accord and satisfaction," the Sixth
Circuit in Leaman treated the Ohio Court of Claims Act as "a
standing offer for a settlement of claims against state employees
in exchange for an otherwise non-existent opportunity to sue
the state itself for damages. '347
In distinguishing Leaman from the worker's compensation
cases and relying on Town of Newton v. Rumery341 in which
the Supreme Court refused to adopt a per se rule banning the
use of release-dismissal agreements in section 1983 actions, the
Sixth Circuit was correct in noting the differences between the
voluntary action of a plaintiff in accepting a release (or an
accord and satisfaction) and a statute that creates an exclusive
remedy. Nonetheless, Leaman rests upon an assumption about
the obligation of state courts to entertain suits against the states.
The key but unexamined assumption upon which the Sixth
Circuit's conclusion rests is that "the Constitution does not
require the state of Ohio to offer any waiver of its sovereign
immunity. ' 349 The Sixth Circuit, however, cited no direct
authority to support this assertion, 350 even though the question
of whether states are obligated to permit suits against them in
their own courts based on federal claims is a difficult issue that
the Supreme Court has not decided. 5' Nonetheless, the
347. 825 F.2d at 953.
348. 480 U.S. 386 (1987).
349. 825 F.2d at 953.
350. The Sixth Circuit did cite Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halder-
man, 465 U.S. 89 (1984), but Pennhurst involved an application of the states'
eleventh amendment immunity to suit in federal court, as the Sixth Circuit
acknowledged in its use of the "Cf." signal. 825 F.2d at 953.
351. See generally Wolcher, Sovereign Immunity and the Supremacy Clause:
Damages Against States in Their Own Courts for Constitutional Violations, 69
CAliF. L. REv. 189 (1981).
The related question of whether states are "persons" within the meaning of
§ 1983 was subsequently answered in the negative by the Supreme Court in
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assumption behind the Supreme Court's eleventh amendment
decisions is that states are subject to suit in the state courts on
the very claims on which they are immune from suits in federal
courts.1
5 2
Clearly, Ohio is not required to establish a Court of Claims.
Nor is it required by federal law to subject itself to suit on state
law claims. On the other hand, Ohio may be under a
constitutional obligation to open its courts to suits against the
state based on federal law. In fact, the Supreme Court suggested
as much more than eighty years ago in General Oil Co. v.
Will v. Michigan Dep't of State Police, 109 S. Ct. l(1989), aff'g Smith v.
Department of Pub. Health, 428 Mich. 540, 410 N.W.2d 749 (1987). Will
involved a § 1983 suit against a state agency in the Michigan Court of Claims
in which Michigan broadly waived its immunity to suit, including suits directly
under the state constitution. Will thus raised the narrow issue of whether states
can ever be "persons" within the meaning of § 1983 rather than the broader
issue of whether states may rely on state sovereign immunity to refuse to
entertain suits against states directly under federal constitutional provisions.
352. In Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234 (1985), the Court,
in approving an eleventh amendment defense, rejected the argument that its
interpretation of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 28 U.S.C. § 794, would leave
individuals whose federal rights were violated by states without a remedy. The
Court noted that such an argument "denigrates the judges who serve on the
state courts [by] suggest[ing] that they will not enforce the supreme law of the
land. Id. at 240 n.2. See also Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman,
465 U.S. 89, 122 (1984) ("Under Edelman v. Jordan, . . . a suit against state
officials for retroactive monetary relief, whether based on federal law or state
law, must be brought in state court."); Employees v. Department of Pub.
Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 298 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring) (citations
and footnotes omitted):
While constitutional limitations upon the federal judicial power bar a
federal court action by these employees to enforce their rights, the courts
of the State nevertheless have an independent constitutional obligation to
entertain employee actions to enforce those rights .... For Missouri has
courts of general jurisdiction competent to hear suits of this character,
and the judges of those courts are co-equal partners with the members of
the federal judiciary in the enforcement of federal law and the Federal
Constitution.... Thus, since federal law stands as the supreme law of
the land, the State's courts are obliged to enforce it, even if it conflicts
with state policy.
Professor Tribe, however, rejects Justice Marshall's suggestion that state
courts are obligated to entertain such federal claims. See L. TmE, AmmicAN
CONsTrrruoNAL LAW 184 n.45 (2d ed. 1988).
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Crain,353 a case decided the same day as Ex Parte Young. 54 Ex
Parte Young created an exception to the eleventh amendment
in suits against states in federal court by permitting suits against
state officials. Crain, however, involved the use of state sovereign
immunity as a defense to the state court litigation of federal
claims. In Crain the plaintiffs challenged on federal grounds the
constitutionality of state taxation statutes involving the inspection
of oil, but the Tennessee courts dismissed the claim because
Tennessee was immune from suit in its own courts. In reviewing
Crain, the Supreme Court rejected the state sovereign immunity
defense. Although the Court ruled against the plaintiffs on the
merits, it recognized the potential impact that state sovereign
immunity could have on federal law and observed that:
[i]f a suit against state officers is precluded in the national courts
by the Eleventh Amendment ... and may be forbidden by a State
to its courts, ... an easy way is open to prevent the enforcement
of many provisions of the Constitution, and the Fourteenth
Amendment, which is directed at state action, could be nullified
as to much of its operation. 355
The amenability of states to suit in their own courts on federal
claims raises many complex issues, and the Sixth Circuit in
Leaman treated this question as central to its analysis.
Nonetheless, the court failed to analyze its assumption that
states are not required to waive any of their sovereign immunity.
Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's decision in Leaman ignores the
nature of section 1983, which the Supreme Court in Monroe v.
Pape35 6 described as a "supplementary remedy." To deny
plaintiffs their section 1983 causes of action against persons
responsible for deprivations of federal constitutional rights
because the state provides a state remedy that may redress the
violation permits states to adopt a wide range of similar waiver
statutes in which injured plaintiffs will be required to waive
their federal remedies as the price of using state remedies. For
353. 209 U.S. 211 (1908).
354. 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
355. Id. at 226.
356. 365 U.S. 167, 183 (1961).
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example, after Leaman a state could provide that any plaintiff
who files a state-created tort claim against police officers or
municipalities based on the conduct of police officers is deemed
to have "completely waived any other cause of action" against
the employee. Since the state is not required to create such
remedies, the Leaman majority would presumably treat a
plaintiff's use of such remedies as an accord and satisfaction
and a waiver of all section 1983 claims.
The application of these waiver principles to section 1983
actions goes far beyond the negotiated settlement approved in
Rumery. Section 1983 cannot be a supplementary federal remedy
if states may create exclusive remedies or set up automatic waiver
provisions. The Leaman court does not hold that states may
make state remedies exclusive or limit access to federal courts,
but the Sixth Circuit seems to have been so enamored by what
Judge Keith described in his dissent as its "simple contractual
metaphor ' 35 7 that it lost sight of the nature of the remedy
created by section 1983.
Although the waiver provision of the Court of Claims Act
seems to limit the jurisdiction of the federal courts, the provision
really only limits the section 1983 cause of action, regardless of
forum, and the Sixth Circuit in Leaman correctly rejected the
jurisdictional argument. Nonetheless, post-Leaman cases will
raise the issue of the impact of the waiver provision on federal
court jurisdiction.
In Leaman the Court of Claims had already determined that
the termination of the plaintiff was in accordance with state
law. This finding triggered the statutory waiver provision,35 and
the Sixth Circuit did not have to rule on whether federal courts
could also decide whether state employees were acting beyond
the scope of their employment.
In other cases, however, federal court section 1983 actions
against individual state employees will be brought before the
Court of Claims has made any determination concerning the
scope of employment. Prior to Leaman, the Court of Claims
357. 825 F.2d at 958 (Keith, J., dissenting). Judge Keith criticized the Leaman
majority for "characteriz[ing] the effect of its holding in terms of a simple
contractual metaphor, as if Constitutional rights are bushels of wheat and the
Constitution itself the Restatement (Second) of Contracts." Id.
358. 825 F.2d at 952-53.
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did not have exclusive jurisdiction to make such determinations,
but the Ohio General Assembly has amended state law to provide
the Court of Claims with such exclusive authority.359
Unlike Leaman, such cases will raise directly the question of
whether state law may give state courts exclusive jurisdiction
over such state law issues. There is, however, a long line of
federal court cases that make clear that states may not divest
federal courts of jurisdiction a.3 6 Moreover, plaintiffs in federal
court section 1983 actions are not required to exhaust state
judicial remedies.3 61 Thus, an extension of Leaman that precluded
federal courts from addressing the state law issue of whether
state employees were acting beyond the scope of their employment
would preclude federal courts from exercising jurisdiction over
cases otherwise within their subject matter jurisdiction.
IX. OTHER SECTION 1983 IssuEs
In addition to the principal section 1983 cases discussed earlier,
the Sixth Circuit has decided section 1983 cases involving federal
statutory claims, abstention, the color of law requirement, and
359. This amendment was passed by the Ohio General Assembly before the
decision in Cooperman v. University Surgical Assocs., 32 Ohio St.3d 191, 513
N.E.2d 288 (1987), permitting § 1983 actions to be brought against state
officials in the Ohio Court of Common Pleas and rejecting the argument that
Court of Claims had exclusive jurisdiction to determine whether state officials
had acted beyond the scope of their employment. The amendment, which was
apparently intended to overrule the anticipated decision in Cooperman, gives
the Ohio Court of Claims "exclusive original jurisdiction" to decide the scope
of employment issue and thus the availability of an immunity under state law.
See Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2743.02(F) (Anderson Supp. 1987).
Although federal not state immunities apply to § 1983 litigation regardless
of forum, see generally Felder v. Casey, 108 S. Ct. 2302, 2307 (1988), the
amended state statute will be relevant when federal court § 1983 plaintiffs join
pendent state law claims against state employees.
360. See, e.g., Chicot County v. Sherwood, 148 U.S. 529, 534 (1893); Home
Ins. Co. v. Morse, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 445, 453 (1874); Railway Co. v. Whitton's
Adm'r, 80 U.S. (13 Wall.) 270 (1871). See also Thompkins v. Stuttgart School
Dist. No. 22, 787 F.2d 439, 442 (8th Cir. 1986) ("To allow a state legislature
to limit the pendent jurisdiction of the federal courts would in many cases
defeat the purpose of pendent jurisdiction...."). Cf. Felder v. Casey, 108 S.
Ct. 2302, 2307 (1988) (state law may not burden litigation of federal claims).
361. See generally Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
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the relevance of state remedies during the two-year period under
study, and these issues will be discussed briefly.
A. Federal Statutory Claims
In Maine v. Thiboutot 62 the Supreme Court construed the
phrase "and laws" in section 1983 literally to reach all federal
statutes, but in subsequent cases the Court read implied limitations
into the phrase.3 63 Thus, where Congress adopts statutes that
have their own comprehensive set of remedial provisions,
plaintiffs may not enforce such statutes through section 1983 .3
Likewise, when federal statutes contain provisions that are not
susceptible to the development of judicially enforceable standards,
the Court also limits the availability of section 1983.365
In Scrivner v. Andrews,36 the Sixth Circuit addressed the
availability of section 1983 to enforce federal statutory provisions
and held that a mother whose child was in foster care could
not use section 1983 to obtain the "meaningful visitation"
provided in the federal Adoption Assistance and Child Welfare
Act. 367 Because the Act encouraged but did not mandate
"meaningful visitation," the court concluded that it did not
secure rights enforceable through section 1983. Thus, the court
denied the plaintiff the right to use section 1983 to seek damages
or injunctive relief for denials of her visitation rights. 36
362. 448 U.S. 1 (1980).
363. See generally Sunstein, Section 1983 and the Private Enforcement of
Federal Law, 49 U. Cm. L. REv. 394 (1982).
364. See Middlesex County Sewerage Auth. v. National Sea Clamnners Ass'n,
453 U.S. 1 (1981).
365. See Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
See also Wright v. City of Roanoke Redev. & Hous. Auth., 479 U.S. 418,
423-24 (1987) (discussing exceptions to Thiboutot).
366. 816 F.2d 261 (6th Cir. 1987).
367. 42 U.S.C. §§ 620-28 (1982).
368. In taking this position, the Sixth Circuit distinguished Lynch v. Dukakis,
719 F.2d 504 (1st Cir. 1983), in which the First Circuit authorized injunctive
relief to enforce the provision of the Act requiring individual case plans and
case reviews. Id. at 512.
Spring 1989]
HeinOnline  -- 20 U. Tol. L. Rev. 579 1988-1989
TOLEDO LA W REVIEW
B. Abstention
In Watts v. Burkhart69 the court applied principles of equitable
abstention to a suit by a physician to enjoin a state administrative
proceeding initiated to suspend his license to practice medicine.
Relying on Ohio Civil Rights Commission v. Dayton Christian
Schools, Inc. ,370 the Sixth Circuit held that the physician could
not bring a federal court section 1983 action to challenge the
pending administrative proceeding. On the other hand, the Sixth
Circuit reversed the trial court dismissal of the section 1983
claim for damages, holding that such claim should have been
stayed rather than dismissed under the recent Supreme Court
decision in Deakins v. Monaghan.3 71 Because the plaintiff could
not obtain redress for his monetary claims in the state court
proceeding, the Sixth Circuit concluded that the dismissal was
inappropriate.172
C. Color of Law
To litigate a claim under section 1983, a plaintiff must establish
not only a deprivation of rights secured by federal law but also
that the defendant acted "under color of law. 3 7 The Sixth
Circuit decided two cases involving the "color of law"
requirement during the period.
In Jones v. Duncan374 the court reviewed the pleading standards
for alleging that defendants acted under "color of law" in a
suit by a former county superintendent of schools against
members of a county commission. The plaintiff alleged that
members of the commission filed suit in state court to seek his
removal, but the district court dismissed the complaint because
it viewed the defendants as having acted in their unofficial
capacities as private citizens. In reversing, the Sixth Circuit
(unlike the district court) did not confine its analysis to state
369. 854 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1988).
370. 477 U.S. 619 (1986).
371. 484 U.S. 193 (1988).
372. 854 F.2d at 849.
373. See Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981); Adickes v. S.H. Kress &
Co., 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
374. 840 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1988).
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law, which provided that individual citizens could bring ouster
suits. Rather, the court relied on a larger series of predicate
actions taken by the commissioners in their official roles,
including use of public funds to finance the ouster proceedings.175
In Adams v. Vandemark376 the Sixth Circuit decided a more
complex color of law issue in two section 1983 actions brought
by former employees of a federally-funded weatherization
program run by a non-profit Michigan corporation established
to receive community action program grants. The plaintiffs
claimed that they were discharged in retaliation for exercising
their first amendment rights, but the issue on appeal was whether
the non-profit corporation, which received between 90 and 990/%
of its budget from governmental funding, and its director were
acting under color of law and thus subject to suits under section
1983. The majority examined the various links between the
defendant organization and the state, including the public
funding, the public regulation, the use of public facilities for a
nominal rent, and the board of directors composed of one-third
public officials pursuant to state law, but concluded that none
of these linkages established the symbiotic relationship between
the state and the defendants that would have met the section
1983 color of law requirement.3 77There is a sharp dissent in Adams by Judge Merritt, who
relied in part on the recent Supreme Court decision in West v.
Atkins.178 West involved whether a private physician who provided
medical care to state prisoners under a contract with the state
prison was subject to suit under section 1983 for an eighth
amendment claim based on his alleged deliberate indifference to
the serious medical needs of a prisoner. In finding color of law,
the West Court did not look to the traditional state action
doctrines but rather relied heavily on the unique facts of the
case, especially the state's duty to provide medical services and
the absence of other access to these services.
Relying on West, Judge Merritt in Adams argued for greater
concern for "the functional role played by a private party and
375. Id. at 362-63.
376. 855 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 868 (1989).
377. Id. at 316-17.
378. 108 S. Ct. 2250 (1988).
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the context of its relationship with the state, and less with the
formal nature of ... [the] legal relationship. 3 79 He then looked
to agency principles to develop a non-exhaustive list of factors
that should help resolve close state action questions and concluded
that the "wholly public[ly]" funded agency was involved in a
"highly regulated" welfare program that "substitute[d] a
government program for the private marketplace.' '380
D. Parratt v. Taylor, State of Mind Requirements, and the
Adequacy of State Remedies
In Parratt v. Taylor381 the Supreme Court held that the
requirements of procedural due process were met in cases in
which governmental officials had acted in random and
unauthorized ways if the state provided an adequate post-
deprivation remedy. In Hudson v. Palmer3 12 the Court expanded
Parratt to intentional deprivations of property and, although
the Court has not decided whether Parratt also applies to liberty
deprivations, 383 most courts,384 including the Sixth Circuit in
Wilson v. Beebe, 85 apply Parratt to liberty deprivations. The
Supreme Court also appears to have limited Parratt to procedural
due process claims, and federal courts, including the Sixth
Circuit, 386 have consistently refused to apply Parratt to substantive
due process claims.3 17
379. 855 F.2d at 320.
380. Id. at 323. See also id. at 322 ("The entity ... was created by
government, is sustained by government, is required to further government
purposes, and cannot exist without government. It is strange indeed to char-
acterize such an animal as 'private', a real confusion of categories...
381. 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
382. 468 U.S. 517 (1984).
383. See Conway v. Village of Mt. Kisco, 750 F.2d 205 (2d Cit. 1984) &
758 F.2d 46 (2d Cir. 1985), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 479 U.S.
84 (1986).
384. See, e.g., Thibodeaux v. Bordelon, 740 F.2d 329 (5th Cir. 1984); Wolf-
Lillie v. Sonquist, 699 F.2d 864 (7th Cir. 1984).
385. 770 F.2d 578 (6th Cir. 1985) (en banc).
386. See, e.g., Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal Court, 820 F.2d 194 (6th
Cir. 1987); Dugan v. Brooks, 818 F.2d 513 (6th Cir. 1987).
387. See M. SCHWARTZ & J. Kn~xu.I , supra note 104, § 3.9, and cases cited
therein.
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In Parratt the Supreme Court also held that negligent conduct
could give rise to a deprivation within the meaning of the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment, but the Court in
Daniels v. Williams 88 and Davidson v. Cannon8 9 reversed this
aspect of Parratt and held that mere negligence does not give
rise to a due process claim. In Daniels, however, the Court
explicitly left open whether gross negligence or reckless disregard
of the plaintiffs' rights could give rise to a due process violation.319
The Sixth Circuit addressed this issue in Nishiyama v. Dickson
County, Tennessee 9' and held that allegations of gross negligence
could be sufficient to establish a due process violation. Nishiyama
was a section 1983 action by parents whose daughter was killed
by an inmate who was driving a fully equipped official patrol
car with the authorization of the sheriff and deputy. The Sixth
Circuit not only held that intentional conduct was not required
in section 1983 substantive due process actions but also found
the close relationship between the criminal act and the defendants'
acts sufficient to state a substantive due process claim. 392
The Sixth Circuit has also addressed various issues involving
the application of Parratt. In section 1983 cases in which Parratt
is applicable, the Sixth Circuit requires plaintiffs to plead and
prove the inadequacy of the state judicial remedy. 393 The court
reaffirmed that position in Sproul v. City of Wooster,394 a section
1983 suit by a real estate developer whose plans for the
388. 474 U.S. 327 (1986).
389. 474 U.S. 344 (1986).
390. 474 U.S. at 334 n.3.
391. 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc).
392. Id. at 281-82. But see Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211 (7th
Cir. 1988) (en banc) (gross negligence not sufficient to raise substantive due
process claim), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1338 (1989).
Nishiyama's reliance on a special relationship to support a substantive due
process claim is no longer good law. The Supreme Court in DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Social Servs., 109 S. Ct. 998 (1989), held that
the failure to provide a child with adequate protection against his father's
violence did not violate the child's substantive due process rights despite the
special relationship between the child and the county social worker.
393. See Vicroy v. Walton, 721 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir. 1983), reh'g en banc
denied, 730 F.2d 466 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 834 (1984).
394. 840 F.2d 1267 (6th Cir. 1988).
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construction of a shopping center were thwarted. In addition to
a federal antitrust claim, the plaintiff raised a pendent state law
contract claim and a section 1983 procedural due process claim,
but the court noted that the failure to plead or prove the
inadequacy of the state judicial remedy required dismissal of
the section 1983 claim.
The Supreme Court only applies Parratt to cases in which the
challenged conduct was random and unauthorized, because in
cases involving established state policies the requirements of
procedural due process can be met through timely post-
deprivation hearings. In Vinson v. Campbell County Fiscal
Court395 a mother whose children had been removed from her
custody in Ohio by a Kentucky juvenile services probation officer
brought a section 1983 action against the probation officer. The
court noted that the plaintiff had alleged a deprivation of a
liberty interest because of the failure to follow established state
procedures, and therefore, she had to plead and prove that state
postdeprivation remedies were inadequate. The plaintiff, however,
could have brought a state tort false imprisonment claim against
the probation officer, and the Sixth Circuit concluded that there
was an adequate remedy that met the state's obligation to
provide procedural due process to remedy the random and
unauthorized violations of law.
In Ramsey v. Board of Education of Whitley County,
Kentucky3'9 the Sixth Circuit treated an action by a retired
school teacher challenging a reduction in accumulated sick leave
days as a procedural due process claim. Although it is not clear
that the plaintiff saw this as a procedural rather than a substantive
violation, the Sixth Circuit found that the availability of a post-
deprivation contract action constituted an adequate state remedy
and met the requirements of due process.
In Watts v. Burkhart'9 the Sixth Circuit addressed both the
adequacy of state remedies and the nature of established state
procedures. Watts was a section 1983 action by a physician
seeking to enjoin a state administrative proceeding to suspend
his license to practice medicine. The Sixth Circuit upheld the
395. 820 F.2d 194 (6th Cir. 1987).
396. 844 F.2d 1268 (6th Cir. 1988).
397. 854 F.2d 839 (6th Cir. 1988).
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dismissal of the claim for injunctive relief on equitable abstention
grounds but stayed the damage claim. 391 In refusing to dismiss
the damage claim, the court found that Parratt applied to claims
of deprivations of liberty but did not bar claims based on pre-
deprivation actions taken pursuant to establish state procedures.
Because the court concluded that the state officials could have
provided predeprivation process but arguably chose not to do
so, it found Parratt not applicable.3 9
There is a partial dissent in Watts by Judge Nelson who
disagreed with the dismissal of the procedural due process
damage claim on Parratt grounds. In addition to questioning
whether the alleged action was taken pursuant to established
state procedures, Judge Nelson expressed doubts as to whether
state judicial remedies were really inadequate.4
X. CONCLUSION
During the past two years the Sixth Circuit decided a large
number of cases involving the remedial and procedural aspects
of section 1983. Most of these decisions considered either issues
left open in earlier Supreme Court decisions or the application
of established section 1983 principles to the facts of specific
cases. Nonetheless, the Sixth Circuit has addressed the scope of
section 1983 in a number of important areas, and a discernible
pattern has begun to emerge in which the court is narrowly
construing section 1983 and its related procedural and remedial
doctrines in such a way as to limit the availability of section
1983 in federal courts.
The clearest examples of such cases are the en banc decisions
in Carter v. City of Chattanooga41 and Leaman v. Ohio
Department of Mental Retardation and Development
Disabilities'°2 involving the use of deadly force and the waiver
398. See supra notes 369-72 and accompanying text.
399. 854 F.2d at 843-44.
400. Id. at 850-51. Judge Nelson argued that the Tennessee courts could
entertain actions for injunctive relief and damages, and that such proceedings
constituted an adequate state remedy. Id.
401. 850 F.2d 1119 (6th Cir. 1988) (en banc), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 795
(1989). See supra notes 261-302 and accompanying text.
402. 825 F.2d 946 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc), cert. denied, 108 S. Ct. 2844
(1988). See supra notes 339-61 and accompanying text.
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of section 1983 claims respectively. What is noteworthy about
these cases is the court's voting pattern. In each case, the eight
Reagan-appointed Sixth Circuit judges voted almost unanimously
to restrict the scope of section 1983, thereby restricting access
to federal court. For example, Carter was decided by a vote of
9-5 with all seven of the participating Reagan appointees in the
majority. Likewise, Leaman was decided by a vote of 8-6 with
six of the seven participating Reagan appointees in the majority. 40 3
This voting pattern was also apparent in the en banc decision
in Nishiyama v. Dickson County, Tennessee,4 a section 1983
case in which the Sixth Circuit did not restrict the availability
of section 1983 but held by an 8-6 vote that intentional conduct
was not necessary to establish substantive due process violations.
Of the six Reagan appointees participating in Nishiyama, four
voted to restrict the availability of section 1983 by requiring
that for conduct to be actionable as a substantive due process
violation, it must be directed against a specific targeted
individual. 405
On other important section 1983 issues, the Reagan appointees
have played a dominant role in narrowing the availability of
section 1983. Thus, in panel decisions selecting an appropriate
statute of limitations,4 applying a federal election of remedies
doctrine, 4 7 precluding section 1983 false arrest suits by persons
who had pleaded nolo contendere to underlying offenses, 40 8
restricting the availability of section 1983 in cases involving
deadly or excessive force,4 and limiting the scope of municipal
403. Judge Milburn did not participate in Carter and dissented in Leaman.
Judge Norris voted to rehear Leaman en banc but subsequently recused himself.
See supra note 343.
404. 814 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1987) (en banc). See supra notes 391-92 and
accompanying text.
405. 814 F.2d at 290. Judges Nelson and Boggs voted with the Nishiyama
majority, and Judges Milburn and Norris did not participate.
406. Mulligan v. Hazard, 777 F.2d 340 (6th Cir. 1985) (Milburn and now-
senior Judge Contie), cert. denied, 476 U.S. 1174 (1986).
407. Campbell v. City of Allen Park, 829 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1987) (Nelson
and Boggs). See supra notes 94-115 and accompanying text.
408. Walker v. Schaeffer, 854 F.2d 138 (6th Cir. 1988) (Krupansky and
Wellford). See supra notes 116-20 and accompanying text.
409. Robinette v. Barnes, 854 F.2d 909 (6th Cir. 1988) (Guy and Boggs);
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liability, 410 Reagan appointees on the Sixth Circuit constituted a
majority of the panel.
It is a mistake, however, to view President Reagan's appointees
as completely responsible for the Sixth Circuit's decisions
restricting the scope of section 1983. Although four of his
appointees voted to narrow section 1983 and thereby limit access
to federal court in Carter, Leaman, and Nishiyama, the three
en banc decisions discussed earlier, 4" they were joined in each
of these decisions by Judges Engel and Kennedy, appointees of
Presidents Nixon and Carter. 412 Moreover, Judge Nelson, the
Reagan appointee who has shown the most interest in restricting
the scope of section 1983,' 413 voted with the majority in Nishiyama
to treat grossly negligent conduct as actionable in substantive
due process cases, and Judge Guy, one of the four, has been
critical of the adoption of a one-year limitations period in
Mulligan.414
The Sixth Circuit also includes a group of five pre-Reagan
appointees who have consistently voted against narrowing the
scope of section 1983. Thus, in the three major en banc decisions
discussed in this article-Carter, Leaman, and Nishiyama-
Cameron v. City of Pontiac, Michigan, 813 F.2d 782, 785 (6th Cir. 1987)
(Krupansky, Nelson and Ryan). See supra notes 241-54 and accompanying text.
410. Molton v. City of Cleveland, 839 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1988) (Ryan and
Norris), cert. denied, 109 S. Ct. 1345 (1989). See supra notes 334-38 and
accompanying text.
411. Judges Krupansky, Wellford, Guy and Ryan.
412. Judge (now Chief Judge) Engel, a Nixon appointee, and Judge Kennedy,
a Carter appointee, joined the Reagan appointees in Carter, Leaman, and
Nishiyama.
413. Judge Nelson wrote the en banc opinion in Leaman applying the Ohio
Court of Claims waiver provisions of § 1983 actions. He also pursued aggres-
sively the application of a federal election of remedies doctrine to § 1983
actions without regard to state preclusion principles. See Campbell v. City of
Allen Park, supra, and wrote the majority opinion requiring the application
of a subjective test in fourth amendment excessive use of force cases. See
McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988). Finally, Judge Nelson has
dissented in a recent case involving the proper interpretation of Parratt, see
Watts v. Burkhart, 854 F.2d 839, 849 (6th Cir. 1988) (Nelson, J., dissenting
in part), and suggested that Bivens actions may not be available for due process
damage actions based on unauthorized conduct. See Cale v. Johnson, 861 F.2d
943, 951 (6th Cir. 1988) (Nelson, J., concurring).
414. See supra note 44.
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Judges Lively, Keith, Jones, Merritt and Martin voted in favor
of a liberal construction of section 1983 (or the underlying
constitutional provision) that would expand access of section
1983 plaintiffs to federal court. Even these judges, however,
have not always voted in favor of a broad section 1983 remedy.
For example, Judge Lively voted to reject the application of
state tolling policies to prisoners' section 1983 actions, 45 and
Judges Keith and Martin voted to apply a subjective standard
to fourth amendment excessive use of force claims. 41 6
Nonetheless, there is little question that during the past two
years the Sixth Circuit has become far less receptive to section
1983 claims. Establishing empirically that this is the direct result
of President Reagan's Sixth Circuit appointments, however, is
more difficult. The data collected in this article is limited and
the conclusions reached are necessarily tentative. Moreover, the
law of section 1983 is not standing still, and the argument could
be made that the section 1983 decisions of the new Sixth Circuit
correctly anticipate the direction in which the Supreme Court is
taking the procedural and remedial law of section 1983. 417
415. See supra notes 81-90 and accompanying text (discussing Higley).
416. See supra notes 255-60 and accompanying text (discussing McDowell).
417. In discussing the historical preference for selecting federal courts as
forums to enhance federal rights, one commentator has viewed federal courts
as more familiar with federal law and thus better able to understand federal
law and anticipate its future direction. See Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90
HARv. L. REv. 1105, 1124-25 (1977). Such clairvoyance may be a mixed
blessing, however, in an era in which the trend seems to be a narrowing of
federal remedies. Moreover, the Sixth Circuit's record in anticipating future
directions in the development of § 1983 remedial and procedural issues has not
been particularly good in recent years. See, e.g., Dayton Christian Schools,
Inc. v. Ohio Civil Right Comm'n, 766 F.2d 932 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd, 477
U.S. 619 (1986) (equitable abstention); Elliott v. University of Tenn., 766 F.2d
982 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd in part, 478 U.S. 788 (1986) (administrative res
judicata); Stachura v. Truszkowski, 763 F.2d 211 (6th Cir. 1985), rev'd sub
nom. Memphis Community School Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986)
(damages); Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 746 F.2d 337 (6th Cir. 1984), rev'd,
475 U.S. 469 (1986) (municipal liability); Graham v. Wilson, 742 F.2d 1455
(6th Cir. 1984), rev'd sub nom. Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159 (1985)
(official capacity); Brandon v. Holt, 719 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1983) (official
capacity suits), rev'd, 469 U.S. 464 (1985); McDonald v. City of West Branch,
709 F.2d 1505 (6th Cir. 1983) (table), rev'd, 466 U.S. 284 (1984) (preclusion);
Migra v. Warren City School Dist., 703 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1982), vacated, 465
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This article concludes, however, that many of the Sixth Circuit's
most important section 1983 procedural and remedial decisions-
especially Mulligan, Higley, Campbell, Carter, Molton,
McDowell, and Leaman-were either wrongly decided or not
compelled by precedent. Such cases, at a minimum, fall in the
gray area, and a different result could easily have been supported
by Supreme Court decisions. Thus, regardless of questions of
causation, the clear emerging trend in the Sixth Circuit is a
narrowing of the scope of section 1983.
Despite this trend, plaintiffs who can establish serious abuses
of governmental authority are still often able to overcome the
remedial and procedural obstacles to reaching the merits of
section 1983 actions and prevail on their federal claims.4 1 1
Nonetheless, recent section 1983 decisions in the Sixth Circuit
should make plaintiffs pause before selecting federal courts as
the forums for pursuing even meritorious section 1983 claims.4 19
U.S. 75 (1984) (claim preclusion). But see Saxner v. Benson, 727 F.2d 669 (6th
Cir. 1984), aff'd sub nom. Cleavinger v. Saxner, 474 U.S. 193 (1985) (immu-
nity); Garner v. Memphis Police Dep't, 710 F.2d 240 (6th Cir. 1983), aff'd
sub nom. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1 (1985) (deadly force).
418. See supra notes 12-13 (describing substantive decisions in § 1983 and
other civil rights actions).
419. One result of the lack of receptivity of federal courts to § 1983 claims
has been the increase in state court § 1983 litigation. See generally, Steinglass,
supra note 5.
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